

October 19, 1981

THE INTERNATIONAL NEWSMAGAZINE

®

# Newsweek

## 'Act Of Infamy'

### The Sadat Assassination And Its Impact


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Number 42



# CAMEL

None tastes  
better.







### Cairo's Day of the Assassins

Anwar Sadat sat in a reviewing stand in Cairo, a commanding figure in gold-braided hat, dress uniform and green sash. As the Egyptian President watched an extravagant military parade celebrating his 1973 surprise attack on Israel, a junior lieutenant stepped from a truck and walked toward him. Sadat rose, expecting a salute. Instead, the officer tossed a grenade and a band of accomplices scrambled from the truck and opened fire. Mortally wounded, Sadat fell in a bloody jumble of overturned

chairs. His assassination left the Middle East facing a dangerous political void, and left Americans with a keen sense of loss. NEWSWEEK's cover story chronicles the last hours of America's partner for peace in the Middle East and records the 45-second horror of his assassination in a portfolio of exclusive photographs by Kevin Fleming and Rachad el Koussy. Some of the other articles in a 25-page package profile the Islamic extremists, explore Egypt's political future in an interview with Sadat's handpicked successor, Vice President Hosni Mubarak, and analyze the new dangers in the Middle East. *Page 10*

### A Long, Hard Winter?

The trouble began because of cigarettes, fruit and fish. When the Polish Government announced last week that it was raising prices, delegates at the Solidarity congress in Gdansk erupted. They threatened a strike and issued a new challenge to the government. Moderation ultimately prevailed for now, but Poland is still bracing itself for a long, potentially painful winter. *Page 42*

### China's Free Farmers

It was one of history's most sweeping experiments in forced social change: Mao Tse-tung's decision to marshal China's peasants into tens of thousands of "people's communes." But a quarter-century later, Mao's "pragmatist" successors are dissatisfied with the results—and have opened the barn door to the return of profit-conscious, private family farming. *Page 45*

### The Money Markets

With its fiscal policies under attack in Congress, the Reagan Administration is seeking a familiar scapegoat: the Federal Reserve Board. The risk, if the Fed weakens, would be yet another bout of inflation in the United States. Even as that battle went on, the pressure of high U.S. interest rates helped spur a major realignment in the exchange rates of European currencies. *Page 51*

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
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Newsweek



# Cairo's Day of





SPECIAL REPORT

# the Assassins







Photo on preceding page by Rachad el Koussy—Sygma


*Anwar Sadat's killers charge the Presidential reviewing stand (preceding page), a woman tends the wounded Belgian ambassador*





Photos © National Geographic Magazine by Kevin Fleming—Woodtin Camp & Assoc.

*Egyptian security officials capture and carry off a suspected assassin moments after the carnage in Cairo came to an end*





# 'An Act of Infamy'

Anwar Sadat loved the pageantry of a military parade. He was so certain of the loyalty of his troops that on parade days he often told his security guards "Please go away—I am with my children." On the eighth anniversary of his surprise attack on Israel last week, Sadat was presiding over an extravagant military show in Cairo when a junior lieutenant in crisp khakis and blue beret stepped from a truck and walked toward him. Sadat rose, expecting a salute. Instead, the young officer tossed a grenade. A band of accomplices then scrambled from the back of the truck, flinging concussion and fragmentation grenades and firing submachine guns. Sadat gasped and fell, mortally wounded, in a bloody jumble of overturned chairs.

The assassination left the Mideast facing a dangerous political void, and it left the world without one of the few leaders whose bold imagination and personal courage seemed to have made a difference to history. Americans, in particular, felt a sharp sense of loss. "You can count on me," Sadat had told Reagan only last August. To a nation that had learned to count on him, the murder brought back a flood of images: Sadat bear-hugging Henry Kissinger in the days of shuttle diplomacy; Sadat laughing with Golda Meir on his historic trip to Jerusalem; Sadat, hands triple clenched with Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin after the exuberant descent from Camp David. Stepping out on the North Portico of the White House, Ronald Reagan, misty-eyed, mourned him. "Anwar Sadat was admired and loved by the people of America," Reagan said. "His death today, an act of infamy, cowardly infamy, fills us with horror."

For security reasons, Reagan did not attend Sadat's funeral. Instead, he invited Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the other three presidents who had worked with Sadat through the years, to represent the United States in a delegation led by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In Cairo, the mourners joined French President François Mitterrand, Britain's Prince Charles, West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other dignitaries from the West. Amid tight security, a caisson drawn by six horses bore Sadat's casket 900 yards to a sarcophagus in Egypt's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—directly opposite the reviewing stand in which he died. Menachem Begin was there for the funeral. But among the Arab states, only the Sudan, Oman and Somalia sent representatives. Other Arab leaders stayed home in one final rebuke for Sadat's lonely peace with Israel.

**Radical Pressure:** The assassination cost Israel its only friend in the Arab world. The immediate question was whether Sadat's entente with Israel would survive him, or whether his handpicked successor, Hosni Mubarak, 53, would yield to the pressure of radical Arabs and the more friendly persuasion of Saudi Arabia. Mubarak pledged that Egypt would proceed down the track Sadat had cleared. "Camp David is Camp David," he told NEWSWEEK. "We are going to respect our word, the peace treaty and normalization." In Jerusalem, Begin lamented Sadat's "criminal assassination." "The peace process . . . will continue, as we know President Sadat would wish with all his heart," Begin said. But the murder only seemed to hearten radical Arabs. On the occupied West Bank,

AP

*The last parade: A caisson drawn by six horses carries Sadat's body to a burial place at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier*

jubilant Arab shopkeepers passed out candy. In Beirut, leftist militiamen honked car horns and fired automatic rifles into the sky. In Tripoli, crowds waving the green flag of Libya danced in the streets, in what one Western envoy called "ghastly jubilation."

Everyone studied Mubarak anxiously. In Cairo, the Egyptian Parliament formally nominated him for President by a vote of 330-0, clearing the way for his official election in a pro forma national referendum early this week. Mubarak's interim government moved quickly to maintain order, imposing a one-year state of emergency and ordering the arrest and interrogation of a number of leftists and radical Islamic fundamentalists. In Assyut, 240 miles south of Cairo, religious fundamentalists opened fire on a police building, killing two officers and leaving scores of others dead and wounded in a 30-hour battle. Later, gunmen in a speeding automobile raked a police station in Cairo, killing at least one officer.

**Invitation to Washington:** Mubarak's first days on the job reassured Washington. In an effort to cement the relationship, Reagan invited the new Egyptian President to visit the United States next year. Mubarak and Begin also agreed to hold a summit of their own. But Sadat's murder further exposed the vulnerability of a U.S. Mideast policy that has relied heavily on understandings with such vulnerable autocrats as the Shah of Iran, President

Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan and the Saudi royal family. The trauma in Cairo could only cast new doubts over the already tattered state of the Palestinian autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel and over Israel's final withdrawal from the Sinai desert, scheduled for next April. And it further clouded the debate in Congress over whether to sell sophisticated AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia: the Administration contended that Sadat's death meant that it was more important than ever to pla-

cate and bolster the Saudis; opponents said the murder argued far more powerfully for keeping sensitive American military technology out of a region of newly demonstrated instability.

The assassination was a nightmare that U.S. officials had long dreaded. Over the years, the United States had contributed nearly \$25 million toward Sadat's security. Beginning in 1974, the U.S. Secret Service had trained Egyptian security men in skills ranging from evasive driving to crowd control. In 1974 Richard Nixon gave Sadat a \$2 million Sikorsky CH-53E armored helicopter—after Sadat praised its quiet ride during a flight with Nixon over Cairo. The Central Intelligence Agency chipped in advanced communications equipment designed to protect messages between Sadat's bodyguards against interception by other Egyptian military or police forces. Last year Jimmy Carter dispatched an AWACS plane from Saudi Arabia to scan the skies and warn Sadat of any challenge from Libyan fighters during one of the Egyptian President's flights to the Sudan.

None of the technology helped against the assassins led by Khaled Ahmed Shawky al Islambouli, a fresh-faced young lieutenant linked to Al Taqfir wal Hijra, an offshoot of Egypt's outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Egyptian security men apparently caught wind of the plot and had been on Islambouli's trail for several

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*Sadat's murder shocks  
the world and leaves  
a dangerous void  
in the Middle East.*

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## SPECIAL REPORT

weeks. In mid-September they arrested about twenty suspects. Their interrogation led to the arrest of some 50 additional suspects later in the month. The roundup left the Egyptian Army untouched and Islambouli free to pursue his plot. After the assassination, the Egyptians took pains to emphasize that the murder plot seemed to go no further than the four assassins who took part. There was no hard evidence yet of a wider conspiracy. But there were some disturbing questions left unanswered. "How do you get live ammunition in a parade?" asked one U.S. official. "How do you get into the truck closest to the reviewing stand? How do you arrive at the stand just as jets are flying over? Do [lieutenants] plan these kinds of things?"

Sadat died on his favorite holiday: Oct. 6, the eighth anniversary of Egypt's lightning strike on Israeli positions across the Suez Canal at the start of the Yom Kippur war. He was cheerful and relaxed as his black Cadillac convertible eased through Cairo's streets on the way to Nasr City, an ugly, modern suburb. He placed a wreath on the pyramid-shaped Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. At 11 o'clock he joined Egypt's political and military leaders and 1,000 guests—mostly ambassadors, other diplomats and journalists—on the massive brick-and-concrete reviewing stand. Sadat listened reverently as verses from the Koran were read. He nodded in strong approval as Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala declared in his opening remarks that "history will judge people by their deeds." Then Sadat settled back, flanked by Abu Ghazala and Mubarak, to watch a two-hour military parade and air show.

**Impostors:** Islambouli and his men were also in position. According to Egyptian investigators, Islambouli gave his usual three-man gun crew a leave of absence on the day of the parade. Islambouli told parade officers that his crew was sick; in their place, he produced three uniformed men who he said had been detached from another army unit. To complete the deception, the lieutenant elaborately "searched" the three impostors as they entered the parade's cordoned-off staging area in the early morning. They may have smuggled in the ammunition and grenades—loaded weapons were forbidden during the parade—or they may have stashed or buried the ammunition in the staging area beforehand.

The parade reverberated with noise and fireworks. Mortars fired little parachutes carrying tiny Egyptian flags and portraits of Sadat. Jet fighters shrieked so low that many guests blocked their

Photos © National Geographic Magazine by Kevin Fleming—Woodfin Camp & Assoc.

*The aftermath of an assassination: A tangle of chairs, bodies and stunned survivors; armed guards and soldiers surround one of the President's suspected assailants*







Courtesy CBS News


*A nightmare unfolds: The Vice President, Sadat, the Defense Minister; the assassins make their move*

PPA

ears. Sadat enjoyed the fun. He used his binoculars for a better look at the acrobatic skydivers. He saluted the turbaned Hagganah Camel Corps, which still patrols parts of the Egyptian frontier. He puffed on his pipe, took off his hat to wipe the sweat from his face and chatted with Mubarak about plans for another grand ceremony next April 25, when Israel is due to return the last section of the occupied Sinai to Egypt. Finally a column of 72 Soviet-made Zil-151 flat-bed trucks—stacked four abreast, each towing a North Korean-made 130mm armor-piercing gun—rumbled into view. It was one of the less-spectacular displays, a signal that the parade was grinding to a finish.

In the second group of trucks, in the second to last row, Islambouli sat beside the driver of the vehicle that would pass closest to the reviewing stand. His men were in the rear of the truck. As the truck drew opposite Sadat, Islambouli pulled out a hand grenade and ordered the driver to stop. When the driver hesitated, Islambouli reached over and yanked the hand brake. In the reviewing stand, most of the spectators were looking at the sky, where a flight of French-made Mirage 5-E fighters swooped low, spewing red, blue, orange, green and gray smoke.

Anyone who noticed the artillery truck pull slightly out of line and stop opposite the reviewing stand could not have been very alarmed. Breakdowns are common in the Egyptian motor pool; earlier in the parade, a motorcycle and another military vehicle had stopped with engine trouble. It was also typical of Sadat to assume that First Lt. Islambouli was approaching to pay his respects. After the first grenade was thrown and the firing started, Vice President Mubarak, who had automatically risen with Sadat, felt himself



Rachad el Koussy—Sygma

*With grenades and submachine guns, Islambouli's marksmen close in for the kill; wounded American servicemen Ryan (being assisted by a woman) and Agenbroad*

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pushed to the ground and tried to bring the President with him. But Sadat, perhaps incredulous that he was under attack, resisted. Sadat's longtime bodyguard, Ahmed Sirhan, fired off all six rounds of his pistol, shouting at his leader: "Get your head down! Get your head down!"

**Shrapnel:** A hand grenade fell at the feet of Abu Ghazala, the defense minister, but did not explode. Another grenade hit Lt. Gen. Abd Rab el Nabi, the armed forces Chief of Staff, in the face, but it also bounced away. At least one grenade, which apparently hit the front of the re-



Rachad el Koussy—Sygma

*Mubarak, Sadat and Abu Ghazala in the reviewing stand: The President loved a parade*


viewing stand, exploded, spraying shrapnel on Sadat and his entourage. Then two gunmen sprinted up to the reviewing stand and pumped a spray of bullets into the Presidential party. A third gunman shot from the side of the stand. Sadat's personal secretary, Fawzi Abdel Hafez, tried to shield the President with his chair until he fell, also wounded. "Unconsciously I found myself sliding from my chair to protect myself behind the wall," said Sobhi

Abdel Hakim, president of the council of elders. "I was amazed when I found myself face to face with the President on the floor, his whole face covered in blood."

Sadat was defenseless. When he had arrived for the parade, his limousine was flanked by three guards on each side; two others held onto the back. Where those and other security men were when the shooting broke out and how they responded are still mysteries. In the crucial early



**1** Air show of Egyptian fighter planes draws the attention of spectators in reviewing stands.



**2** A truck leaves the parade and draws up in front of Sadat in the grandstand.

**3** An attacker jumps from the cab of the truck and throws a grenade at the stand.

**4** Three assassins start shooting from the back of the truck, then jump off and run toward the stand, where they spray Sadat and other dignitaries with automatic gunfire.

## 45 SECONDS OF TERROR



seconds, eyewitnesses saw only Sadat's personal bodyguards shoot back. A few other security men, some of them non-Egyptians employed by foreign diplomats attending the parade, also returned fire. But no armed guards stood between Sadat and Islambouli's charging assassins. And no sharpshooters took aim from the upper balconies. Several guards and soldiers ran or ducked for cover.

**Ambulances:** When the shooting died down, Sirhan and another aide lifted Sadat, carried him behind the reviewing stand to a Gazelle helicopter and rushed him 9 miles to Maadi Military Hospital, where almost 15 months earlier his friend the Shah of Iran had died. Stunned, Abu Ghazala rose from the floor, blood trickling down the left side of his face from a cheek wound and also from his right arm. He waved away assistance and began issuing orders. Mubarak was hustled away in a Presidential Volvo and driven to Maadi. Sadat's wife, Jihan, was picked up and carried by a military

officer into another waiting helicopter and flown to Maadi. Egyptian Cabinet ministers screamed for ambulances. A wave of red-bereted troops descended on the reviewing stand and began pushing people away; some of the young soldiers were weeping. Overhead, three Czech-made jets—their pilots unaware of the carnage below—passed in review, leaving a rainbow trail of smoke.


Sadat was wheeled into Maadi hospital still wearing his blood-soaked uniform and bleeding heavily from the mouth. He had been struck five times by bullets and shrapnel. There were two wounds in the left side of his chest, one in his left thigh, one in the right side of his neck, and one in his right forearm. He was rushed to a special heart-and chest-surgery unit on the hospital's fourth floor, where a team of eleven doctors stood by. They could find no trace of a pulse. There were no reflexes. The eyes were open and unresponsive to light. In effect, he was already dead.

The surgeons worked furiously anyway.

They removed clotted blood from Sadat's larynx, inserted an air tube down his throat and began artificial respiration. They started a massive blood transfusion. They inserted a tube in the left side of the chest to remove air and blood. And they administered stimulants, electric shock and open-chest massage in a vain effort to start the heart. Finally, nearly an hour and a half after they received their patient, the doctors concluded that brain death had occurred. According to the official report, Sadat died from a "heavy nervous shock with internal chest hemorrhaging and laceration of the left lung and the main blood vessels at the base of the left lung." A member of the medical team went down to the first floor, where officials, friends and hospital staff had gathered, and recited a simple text from the Koran: "Only God can live forever."

**Dignity:** A few minutes later, Jihan Sadat came down from the operating room with the Sadats' three daughters. Jihan's legs were scratched and her blue silk suit soiled after her escape from the reviewing stand. "She always called herself coldblooded, and that day she really walked tall, with dignity, trying to control herself," said a friend. "But she faltered, and when she reached the hospital exit door, she had to cry." Although she was given sedatives, Jihan managed to receive visitors bringing their condolences. "I expected it. I expected him to be killed," she later told an ABC News interviewer. "But my husband, he

lb Ohlsson—NEWSWEEK



**President Sadat is fatally wounded.**

**Vice President Mubarak is slightly wounded.**

**Defense Minister Abu Ghazala is slightly wounded.**

**5**

Sadat's security guards do not return fire immediately. One gunman is killed moments later, and the others are captured.

**6**

Sadat is carried to a helicopter parked behind the reviewing stand and flown to Maadi Military Hospital.



## SPECIAL REPORT

never expected it. He wouldn't wear his bulletproof vests because he thought it wasn't manly."

In addition to Sadat, at least six others died in the hail of gunfire at the reviewing stand. The dead included Gen. Hassan Al-lam, the President's chief military aide, and Bishop Samuel, a leader of Egypt's Coptic Christian Church. One of Sadat's attackers also was killed, and the three other attackers, including Islambouli, were injured. The scores of wounded also included the Belgian ambassador, the Cuban ambassador, the first secretary in the Australian Embassy and three American servicemen: Lt. Col. Charles Loney, 42, of Austin, Tex-

reported that Sadat was dead; still, there was no official announcement. In Washington, the Egyptian Embassy first lowered its flag to half staff, then raised it again. Faced with the conflicting signals, the Administration decided to stick to its optimistic line and let Cairo announce the catastrophe.

In the State Dining Room of the White House, Reagan and Haig were presiding over lunch with Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanoud of Thailand when an aide passed to Haig a note reporting that Mubarak had scheduled a national television address in Cairo. Haig knew what this meant; he scribbled a note informing Reagan that Sadat was indeed dead. Later in the afternoon the White House announced that American military forces in the Middle East had been

gan reportedly had no hand in the decision, she plainly preferred that her husband stay home. "It's taken her longer to get over the assassination attempt than it's taken him," said a White House aide. The Secret Service also advised against sending George Bush—but agreed that the blue-chip delegation of former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter was a safer security risk than a sitting President or Vice President.

At Reagan's invitation, the three former presidents flew to Washington for an official send-off. Four U.S. presidents had never gathered at the White House before. After cocktails, canapés and small talk in the Blue Room, they posed for photographs—"class pictures," as a Reagan aide quipped. "Ordinarily I would wish you a happy landing," Reagan told the others in a parting toast. "But you're all Navy men, so I wish you bon voyage."

**Jellybeans:** Haig described the flight aboard the Presidential jet as "probably the most extraordinary trip in the annals of the American Presidency." Amid the Administration's ubiquitous jars of jellybeans and some pictures of Ronald Reagan on horseback, Nixon, Ford and Carter sat as ordinary passengers on the plane that they once commanded. Carter changed clothes, replacing his suit with slacks and a beige cardigan, and sat for a while with Nixon to trade reminiscences about Sadat. He later said he got on better with Nixon than with Ford, probably because of Ford's sharp attacks on him in the 1980 Presidential campaign. Haig called the atmosphere "electric," though the most energy seemed to flow



Larry Downing—NEWSWEEK

*All the President's presidents: Reagan with Ford, Nixon and Carter on the White House lawn*

as, wounded in the shoulder; Air Force Capt. Christopher Ryan, 34, of Sacramento, Calif., wounded in the foot; and Marine Maj. Jerald R. Agenbroad, 36, of Bruneau, Idaho, wounded in the right leg.

News of the attack reached Washington by fits and starts. The American Ambassador to Egypt, Alfred Atherton, had attended the military parade in Nasr City. But even before he could report to the State Department, radio reports had alerted American officials. At 7:18, about 30 minutes after the event, Nicholas Veliotis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, notified Haig. At 7:25, Haig called Reagan. The first U.S. assessment was encouraging: Sadat's wounds were "not serious," Atherton reported from Cairo.

Reagan wrote a personal letter to Sadat "praying for your safety" and offering U.S. medical assistance to victims of "this despicable attack." But in Cairo, the same Egyptian officials who had passed on the rosy prognosis to the U.S. Embassy privately

placed in a higher state of readiness—a symbolic gesture of comradeship with Egypt. Reagan attended a briefing on Egypt in the situation room. As the meeting broke up, the President walked past a wall display of photographs commemorating Sadat's visit to Washington two months ago. An aide suggested sending the collection to Jihan Sadat, but Reagan shook his head. It would only make Sadat's widow feel worse, he said.

Reagan never seriously considered attending Sadat's funeral himself because of the security risks. Haig pointed out that the Egyptians might take Reagan's absence as a diplomatic snub, but he did not recommend that Reagan go. Presidential advisers Edwin Meese, James Baker and Michael Deaver firmly opposed the trip. "When all the intelligence agencies are unanimous in saying you shouldn't go, and when you're the only President in history to survive an assassination attempt after being wounded, it's an open-and-shut case," said a senior Presidential adviser. Although Nancy Rea-

into a run of jokes about flying close to the Gulf of Sidra, where American jets had shot it out with Colonel Kaddafi's fighters.

In Jerusalem, Menachem Begin's sorrow at Sadat's death "went beyond matters of state," said an Israeli policymaker. "Begin mourned the death personally." Official word of the assassination reached Jerusalem only after hours of the same kind of anxious uncertainty was felt in Washington. Begin immediately instructed his staff to organize a trip to Cairo to attend Sadat's funeral on Saturday. The decision was more complicated than it seemed. As a religious Jew, Begin could neither fly nor ride on the Jewish Sabbath. Thus he was forced to fly to Cairo a day early and spend the night, multiplying the already considerable security risks. He also had to strain a painfully inflamed knee by walking from his hotel to the funeral. "Begin takes rituals very seriously," one Israeli official noted. "He wanted to demonstrate his respect, both for Sadat and for his successor."

On the day of the assassination, Egyptians






UPI

*A military honor guard escorts Sadat's gun carriage in the funeral cortege; the casket is lowered into a crypt at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; foreign dignitaries—including Ford, Begin, Giscard, Carter, Nixon and Kissinger—pay their last respects*



AP



UPI



## SPECIAL REPORT

had been even more poorly informed than the rest of the world. Live radio and television coverage of the military parade was cut off when the shooting began. Fifteen minutes later an announcer cut in to report that Sadat, Vice President Mubarak and Defense Minister Abu Ghazala had left the parade grounds. Still later another bulletin revealed that Sadat and some of his aides had been injured. Finally, seven hours after the attack, Mubarak appeared on the television screen, his eyes glued to his prepared remarks. "Our leader, loved by millions, the hero of war and peace, is dead," he said. "God has ordered that Sadat should die on a

day which itself is a symbol of him, among soldiers, heroes and people, proudly celebrating the day on which the Arab world regained its dignity."

Mubarak and his supporters quickly cracked down on potential challenges in the streets. Within minutes of Sadat's assassination, army experts interrogated Lieutenant Islambouli and pried out the name and location of his unit: an artillery regiment in Cairo. Tanks and the elite Republican Guard quickly surrounded the 300-man base, but found no evidence of a wider plot. In the city of Assyut, civil strife touched off by Islamic fundamentalists also appeared to reflect an isolated grudge held by religious extremists rather than a broad revolution-

ary conspiracy. Mubarak's interim government rushed troops to Assyut, blocked the access highway and closed the airport. Reporters reaching the city late in the week found streets littered with spent shells, and indications that hundreds of people had been rounded up for questioning.

**Rules of Succession:** Mubarak consolidated his hold on Sadat's political machinery efficiently and with apparent ease. At an emergency Cabinet meeting immediately after Sadat's death, 30 ministers quickly agreed to follow the rules of succession. Speaker of Parliament Sufi Abu Taleb, the Acting President until Mubarak's formal election, declared a one-year state of emergency—and was challenged by only a few



AP

Victims' view: Killer beside abandoned TV camera

## Behind the Gunmen

Who did it?

The evidence so far pointed to a small faction of Islamic fundamentalists. First Lt. Khaled Ahmed Shawky al Islambouli, leader of the squad of assassins, was the brother of a member of a fanatic Islamic group called Al Taqfir wal Hijra. The band relies heavily on blood ties for its recruits and operations. It has about 4,000 members in Egypt and perhaps another 10,000 sympathizers, most of them outraged by Sadat's admiration for Western ways, his hospitality to the late Shah of Iran and his entente cordiale with Israel. "Taqfir wal Hijra is the largest such fundamentalist group in Egypt," says Prof. Saad Eddin Ibrahim of the American University at Cairo. "Each of the hard-core members is a walking time bomb—waiting to go off."

The roots of Al Taqfir wal Hijra are tangled in the fanatic Muslim Brotherhood. The name of the band means "Atonement and Flight"; members are expected to atone for the sins of decadent Egypt with violent acts. The group's spiritual father is Sayyed Kotb, a Muslim firebrand who was executed in 1965 after botching an assassination attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser. Since the Koran condemns all who do not strictly apply Koranic

law, the Taqfir group believes that the blood of heretics must be spilled if they do not repent and return to Islam. The result is a sort of permanent jihad, or holy war. "They are a Moral Majority with AK-47s," says one official at the State Department.

A young follower of Sayyed Kotb named Shukry Mustafa founded Al Taqfir wal Hijra in 1965. In 1977 Shukry Mustafa's men kidnapped Sheik Muhammed al Zahabi, Egypt's previous religious-affairs minister, who was known for relatively permissive religious views. Zahabi was strangled and shot through the left eye, a ritual form of execution. Shukry Mustafa and four henchmen were caught, tried and hanged for the murder a few months later, but Al Taqfir wal Hijra did not die with them.

**Warnings:** Sadat knew about Al Taqfir wal Hijra and its activities. In 1970, when he became President, he issued an amnesty freeing members who had been arrested during Nasser's last years. "I may have made a mistake," he said later. The band has been in the forefront of Islamic dissidence in Egypt. Last August Egyptian intelligence uncovered plans by an extremist group to assassinate Sadat and his wife, Jihan, in their Alexandria summer palace. During Sadat's recent trip to the United States, the alarm signals grew so strong that Sadat canceled a scheduled stopover in Vienna and rushed back to Cairo. Vice President Hosni Mubarak and Interior Minister Nabawi Ismail warned him that Egypt was boiling with assassination plots, that fundamentalists were brazenly pillorying him in village mosques and that radicals on the left were grousing about his palaces, his suits and his wife's jewelry. They feared a coup d'état; they urged a crackdown.

Sadat discussed the dangers with Menachem Begin during Begin's visit to Alexandria in August. At first he refused to undertake a purge, fearing that it would look bad so soon after a trip to America. Sadat also worried that human-rights advocates in Congress would be offended. The Israelis warned him that he was underestimating the threat extremists posed to his life. "He was very calm," said one Israeli official. "His attitude was, 'Don't worry. We'll deal with this'."

When Sadat finally did move last month, he apparently failed to go far enough. He rounded up more than 1,500 opponents, including Lieutenant Islambouli's brother, but he did not include any members of his armed forces in the initial crackdown. That may have been a fatal mistake. "Both Sadat and Mubarak saw to it that the top brass was fully committed to Sadat's policies," says Yigael Yadin, Israel's former Deputy Prime Minister, "but up to the rank of captain, you can never tell." There is as yet no proof that the lieutenant and his fellow assassins belonged to the fanatic society. But they slipped through Sadat's dragnet, pulled up to Sadat's reviewing stand—and, in the spirit of Al Taqfir wal Hijra, killed him.

JAMES LeMOYNE with TIMOTHY NATER in Cairo, MILAN J. KUBIC in Jerusalem and bureau reports




## SPECIAL REPORT

politicians who considered the measure too strict. The next night, Parliament nominated Mubarak for President, voted to retain him as Vice President as well and named him Acting Prime Minister and commander in chief of the armed forces. Early this week 12.5 million voters are expected to ratify Mubarak as Sadat's successor on ballots that ask simply: "Do you agree to elect Hosni Mubarak President of the Republic?"

**Shoppers:** Sadat had considered himself the "head of the Egyptian family," but most Egyptians seemed to take his loss without emotion. Eleven years earlier, millions of people had coursed through the streets mourning the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. But on the day after Sadat's death, Cairo's streets were relatively quiet, occupied mainly by shoppers preparing for the two-day Muslim feast of Eid al Adha. There were few signs of mourning: no black banners, no shop-window portraits of the slain President, no wailing women.

The freshly decreed state of emergency discouraged public mourning: any congregation of five or more people was considered a demonstration and its members were subject to questioning or arrest. Many people in Cairo expressed less outrage over the assassination than over the week's cancellation of movies, soccer games and regular television programming (including the popular series "Dallas"). A few regarded all the commotion as just another of Sadat's surprises: the President was not really dead; he would soon emerge again, perhaps in Washington or in Jerusalem. Other Egyptians were fatalistic. "He didn't deserve to die and it was outrageous," said Ashraf Makar, 23, an



AP photos

*Carter, Ford and Nixon aboard Presidential jet: Mount Rushmore on the road*

electrical engineering student. "But in a way, it was his own fault. There was no need for him to get in a car every day and drive down the streets to show the world that your people love you."

Sadat was buried in a muted ceremony under tight security. Throughout Cairo, trucks mounted with machine guns and troops with fixed bayonets patrolled the streets while helicopters circled overhead. At the burial site, lines of policemen stood with arms locked as if to hold back a crowd. But there was no crowd. Along the highway, only a few hundred keening mourners chanted slogans such as "To paradise, Sadat," and held aloft Sadat's portrait. The

demonstration appeared to have been encouraged by the government for the benefit of foreigners attending the funeral.

The ambulance taking Sadat's coffin from Maadi hospital to a nearby mosque was escorted by jeeps carrying armed Presidential guards. In the mosque, a few male relatives gathered around the coffin, which was covered by an Egyptian flag. After prayers, the coffin was placed in a helicopter and flown to Nasr City, where Carter, Ford, Nixon and the other dignitaries waited. Mubarak led the funeral procession, taking the hand of Sadat's son, Gamal. Jihan Sadat, bareheaded and dressed in black, did not join the procession. Along with her three daughters, she sat in the reviewing stand where her husband had been shot. The stand had been repaired. Workers had plastered and painted over the bullet holes in the wall and replaced the shattered glass.

**Tears:** The horse-drawn funeral caisson proceeded slowly toward the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. It was followed by soldiers bearing Sadat's medals, including the Star of Sinai, which he was wearing around his neck as the assassins struck. Jihan Sadat joined the mourners beside the tomb. Tears streamed down the face of the soldier shouting orders for the 21-gun salute. Before the guns had finished firing, the foreign dignitaries and ambassadors began scurrying off to their limousines, apparently worried about security. Carter, Ford, Nixon and Begin departed before Sadat's body had been entombed. The funeral party left behind a black marble tombstone inscribed with an epitaph echoing one Sadat himself had proposed three years ago: "President Mohammed Anwar Sadat, hero of war and peace. He lived for peace and he was martyred for his principles."

STEVEN STRASSER with ELAINE SCIOLINO, TIMOTHY NATER and JAMES PRINGLE in Cairo and ELEANOR CLIFT and THOMAS M. DeFRANK in Washington

*Jihan Sadat with Carter and Ford during the U.S. delegation's condolence visit*







# A Darkened Landscape

In one murderous hail of gunfire, Anwar Sadat's assassins darkened the whole political landscape of the Middle East last week. Without Sadat's daring and vision, the fragile peace process that he pioneered with Israel could come to a halt, and the uneasy balance between moderate and radical Arab states could tilt even more precariously against the United States. "The man who took risks for peace is dead," said one despondent American diplomat. "The people who did not are still alive—and the people who opposed peace are flourishing."

For the moment, the United States and Israel could only hope that Sadat's successor, Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak, would preserve Sadat's legacy. Mubarak lacks Sadat's charisma, but he is adept at internal politics, and he should win any quick struggle for power within the Egyptian leadership. Under the circumstances, it seems likely that both Egypt and Israel will keep the peace process on track through next April 25, when Israel is scheduled to return the last one-third of occupied Sinai territory to Egypt. "What's going to slow Mubarak down?" asks one U.S. official. "Everybody in Egypt wants the Sinai back."

**Pledges:** The post-Sadat era in Egyptian-Israeli relations began auspiciously last week with an exchange of peace pledges between Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. "The process of peacemaking will continue," Begin declared as he arrived at Cairo airport on the eve of Sadat's funeral. Begin then drove to Mubarak's suburban home, where he greeted the Egyptian with a hug and a pat on the back. Mubarak went out of his way to reassure the Israeli people. In an interview in the Israeli newspaper *Maariv*, he declared: "There are no changes in our policy, and I undertake to honor fully everything that President Sadat agreed to."

Even so, Mubarak may have to pay closer attention to the price Egypt pays for the return of the Sinai than Sadat did. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak needs to build a political constituency at home. He may also cast a different eye on the Arab world. Pressure on Egypt to drive a harder bargain with Israel over Palestinian autonomy will probably materialize at the Arab summit scheduled for Nov. 25 in Fez, Morocco. "The first big problem will be Israeli doubts about Egypt and Mubarak," says one top U.S. offi-

cial. "Those have begun already. The next two months are crucial."

The news of Sadat's assassination encouraged right-wing political extremists in Israel, who saw Sadat's death as proof of the weakness of treaties with unstable Arab regimes and prepared a campaign to block the final Israeli pullout from the Sinai. Said Geula Cohen, a fiery right-wing Knesset deputy: "If we leave Sinai, all we can expect is war." In Washington, State Department

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## *Among the anxieties: Egypt's role in the peace process, renewal of its Arab-world ties —and its own stability.*

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officials counted on Begin's reputation as a legalist and a man of honor to keep Israel moving out of the Sinai on schedule, despite opposition from hard-liners and religious fundamentalists at home.

Even if it takes place entirely as scheduled, the withdrawal from the final portion of the occupied Sinai will be painful for Israel—emotionally as well as strategically. Several civilian settlements, notably the town of Yamit in the northeast corner of the peninsula, will have to be evacuated; the settlers themselves have vowed to stay

put—and may have to be forcibly evacuated by Israeli troops. In addition, the strip is unquestionably of strategic value: it runs from El Arish on the Mediterranean to Sharm el Sheikh on the Red Sea—a vital position controlling the shipping route in and out of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel's southern port of Eilat. Two Israeli air bases are also included in the final strip of the Sinai, and the area forms a natural buffer zone along Israel's southwestern frontier. But refusal to withdraw would mean compromising the whole peace treaty, under which Israel has already relinquished most of the Sinai, including strategic passes and valuable oil fields.

After Israel returns the last portion of the Sinai, the next question is how far Mubarak may go to end Egypt's isolation and return to the Arab fold. Mubarak often served quietly as Sadat's diplomatic point man with Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states, even after they broke diplomatic relations with Cairo following the signing of the Camp David accords. Some Israelis fear that Mubarak may yet succumb to the lure of pan-Arab leadership and play down—or even pare back—Egypt's links with Israel. To head off such a disaster, Begin aides say they will work hard in the coming months to keep from renewing the stalemate in the recently revived talks on West Bank Palestinian autonomy. "We'll definitely take initiatives," said one. "We'll make concrete proposals to get things moving." In the meantime they plan to keep a

very close watch on Mubarak's relations with the confrontationalist radical Arab states—Syria, Iraq, Algeria—and the Palestine Liberation Organization. "That's the litmus test," says one Begin aide. "If we see signs of a rapprochement with those quarters, we'll freeze in our tracks."

**Jubilation:** The extremist Arab camp greeted the news of Sadat's death with such macabre jubilation that any reconciliation with Egypt seemed distant. In war-torn Beirut, left-wing Lebanese militiamen and Palestinian guerrillas paraded through the streets brandishing posters of Gamal Abdel Nasser (whom Sadat had succeeded as President in 1970) and firing assault rifles in the air—wounding at least a dozen bystanders with stray bullets. PLO officials called Sadat's slaying an "execution" rather than an assassination—a re-

*Mubarak greets Begin in Cairo: The next two months would be crucial*





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minder of the Palestinian view that Sadat had met his just punishment for making peace with Israel without first resolving the Palestinian issue. PLO security chief Salah Khalaf, who calls himself Abu Iyad, boasted that the PLO would "shake the hand of him who pulled the trigger." And in Damascus, the government newspaper Tichrin headlined: **TRAITOR FALLS, EGYPT REMAINS.** Inevitably, Col. Muammar Kaddafi of Libya joined the extremist chorus. "From now on no one will take the same course followed by Anwar Sadat," he exulted.

Palestinian mayors on the occupied West Bank did not mourn Sadat either. "Sadat's death is a loss neither to the Egyptian people nor to the Arabs, but to the U.S. and to Israel," declared Karim Khalaf, the leftist mayor of Ramallah. Bassam al Shaka, Mayor of Nablus, echoed the hope that

Sadat's death would somehow ease the lot of the occupied Arabs. "We hope that the Egyptians will now return into the trenches of the nationalist Arabs and fight for Palestinian rights," he said. In most West Bank towns, even moderate Palestinians welcomed the news of Sadat's death with a sense of satisfaction. "He did all right for Egypt, but he sold us down the river," commented one grocer in Bethlehem, who celebrated by handing out free candy to children. "It was just that Allah struck him down."

**Olive Branch:** Beneath the swaggering and gloating, however, even some of Sadat's Arab opponents seemed prepared to offer the new regime in Egypt an olive branch—at least in time. Perhaps speaking for many Arab leaders, Chedli Klibi, secretary-general of the Arab League—which had expelled Egypt from its ranks after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel—suggested that the new Egyptian leadership renounce

Camp David "and restore Egypt to its great and effective national role within the Arab family." PLO leaders indicated they were prepared to watch and wait. "Even if the new rulers of Egypt stick to the Camp David accord for the time being in order to secure the return of the Sinai from the Israelis, there will be understanding from other Arab nations," said a veteran PLO observer in Beirut. "It is only afterwards that Egypt will be expected to resume its rightful position in the mainstream of the Arab world."

Almost certainly, Mubarak will try to bring Egypt in from the cold. For one thing, Egypt—the most populous and one of the most militarily powerful of the Arab nations—is the Arab world's natural leader. The desire to regain Egypt's lost leadership could exert a strong emotional and psychological pull on Mubarak. More important, Egypt needs the friendship and the economic and political support of such moderates as

## Uniting Against Libya

Anwar Sadat's last joint venture with the United States was an ambitious new strategy for dealing with Libya's Col. Muammar Kaddafi. Administration strategists have begun intensive planning with Egypt for a combined response to a Libyan attack on the Sudan or other Soviet-backed aggression in North Africa. The two countries will soon form a joint military commission to help plan such operations—including a possible Egyptian invasion of Libya, though Egypt's military isn't ready to take on Kaddafi yet. The Administration has already decided to accelerate deliveries of weapons, probably including Redeye anti-aircraft missiles to Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry. Says one Reagan strategist: "We don't necessarily want to kill Kaddafi; we just want to tie him up."

The Carter Administration discouraged such thinking by the Egyptians, but the Reagan team reversed American policy and began talks with the Egyptians early this year after Sadat suggested an invasion of Libya to counter Kaddafi's expansionism. Although there is no evidence linking Kaddafi to Sadat's assassination, the murder has given the project new momentum. A still-secret CIA report has identified as many as sixteen terrorist training camps for foreigners in Libya. NEWSWEEK has also learned that Kaddafi reacted to the downing of two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra last August by ordering the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Italy, Maxwell Rabb, 71, who is Jewish and a friend of President Reagan—a plot that was aborted when Italian police deported ten suspected Libyan hit men. Washington officials now believe Kaddafi has called off the assassination attempt, but they are not entirely certain. After the Gulf of Sidra confrontation, U.S. intelligence also picked up evidence that Kaddafi had hatched yet an-

other assassination plot—this time against President Reagan.

In 1976 Kaddafi sent two Egyptian exiles to murder U.S. ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts. Trained by the famous international terrorist known as "Carlos" at the former Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, the two made their way to Cairo, one across the desert and one through the Sudan. But U.S. agents had gotten wind of the plot and had been tracking it for six months. As the two assassins closed in, President Jimmy Carter sent Kaddafi a message warning him to call off the scheme. Kaddafi responded by quoting a verse from the Koran challenging Carter to supply evidence to back up his charge. When Carter did so—in detail—Kaddafi exploded, but the plan was called off. One would-be assassin was captured; the other escaped.

**Bright Star:** The United States and Egypt will test some of their contingency plans next month in a joint military exercise called Operation Bright Star. Although details have not been decided, U.S. strategists are considering an airlift of Egyptian troops to the Sudan under the cover of AWACS aircraft and also the dispatch of a small detachment from the Rapid Deployment

Force to join the maneuvers. In response to an attack on the Sudan or other Libyan provocations, the U.S. Sixth Fleet could be sent back into the Gulf of Sidra to distract Kaddafi's air force and pose problems for Soviet supply ships and oil tankers carrying oil out of Libya. "Those two jets were a sample," says a U.S. official. "We are willing to go to the legal limits." The main obstacles to the plans are the sorry state of Egypt's military and the now uncertain state of its politics. Egypt has 367,000 men under arms compared with Libya's 53,000, but Libya has 2,700 tanks and 500 top-flight aircraft, according to an Egyptian military attaché. "Every plan is ready," he says. "But believe me, we need equipment to fulfill our plans. We are in a hurry—any delay will be dangerous."

MICHAEL REESE with JOHN WALCOTT  
in Washington and bureau reports

*Kaddafi with Yasir Arafat: A threat too long ignored?*

Patrice Barrat—Gamma-Liaison





## SPECIAL REPORT

Jordan and Saudi Arabia. With its vast accumulation of petrodollars, Saudi Arabia could provide financial help for Egypt's chronically troubled economy. With Libya stockpiling Soviet arms and with Kaddafi already threatening to make trouble in neighboring Sudan, Egypt would also welcome the support of moderate Arab states, for obvious strategic reasons.

**Goodwill:** Some Mideast experts believe that moderate states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan—and perhaps even more radical Iraq—may come to view the aftermath of Sadat's death as a time for healing. "Their condemnation of Camp David has always been a fight with Sadat, not with the Egyptian people," says Aaded Dawisha, assistant director of studies at London's Royal Insti-

nians." But Mubarak will probably remain at loggerheads with Libya, Syria and the PLO for some time to come. "There is no basis for accommodation," says Hurewitz. "To satisfy them, he would have to alienate the United States, and I can't see him doing that."

The problem for Mubarak is how to end Egypt's isolation among the Arabs without alarming Israel—and throwing the peace process off track. Some Mideast experts believe rather wistfully that a rapprochement with Egypt could eventually bring Saudi Arabia and Jordan into the negotiations on the future status of the Palestinians—thus opening the way for the "comprehensive peace" originally envisioned at Camp David. But others, like William Quandt of the Brookings Institution, a Mideast expert formerly on Jimmy Carter's Na-

ed Secretary of State Alexander Haig's idea of a "strategic consensus," and he also strongly endorsed the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. "I don't want to panic anybody," says a former Carter White House strategic analyst, "but we have no alternative to Egypt either in terms of the peace process . . . or strategic position. If we couldn't get to the Gulf through Egypt, with overflights for example, we'd be in very, very serious trouble."

Some Administration officials worry that Mubarak may eventually loosen the close military ties that Sadat helped to forge, partly out of dissatisfaction with the slow pace of U.S. arms deliveries. Only about one-third of the \$3.5 billion in U.S. tanks, jets, guns, armored personnel carriers and advanced weapons systems ordered by Egypt have been delivered so far; Egyptian officers

grumble that the Soviets were much speedier. But Mubarak is considered even more staunchly anti-Soviet than Sadat, and there is no fear of Egypt turning back to Moscow. Nor is he likely to renege on Sadat's agreement to make Ras Banas available to the RDF. He may, however, be less inclined to go out of his way to do favors for the Americans—such as Sadat did by allowing the ill-fated U.S. hostage-rescue mission to use Egyptian facilities. With the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia running into opposition, and with a proposed sale of \$3.2 billion in weapons to Pakistan also in trouble in Congress, officials fear that Egypt and other pro-Western regimes in the area may come to look upon the United States as an uncertain and unreliable ally.

Mubarak has made repeated trips to Washington in recent months to plead for prompt arms deliveries. Only five days

before Sadat's assassination, he flew to the United States with an urgent request that arms shipments to Sudan be speeded up to help bolster the regime of President Jaafar Nimeiry against the threat of aggression from next-door Libya. Administration officials take such entreaties and warnings seriously but are hard-pressed to send Egypt the military hardware it wants without siphoning the weapons away from America's own under-equipped units in West Germany. Still, the Administration intends to do what it can. On the flight to Cairo, where he led the American delegation to Sadat's funeral, Haig told newsmen that the United States is preparing to speed up the deliveries of military equipment to Egypt. Haig also said he would urge Mubarak to sign a treaty of cooperation with Sudan to bolster that country's pro-West regime.

The death of Sadat has plunged the Rea-



*Celebrating Sadat's death in Beirut: An offer to 'shake the hand of him who pulled the trigger'*

tute of International Affairs. "They will now have the lines open again and some hope that the new man will be more in tune with their line of thinking."

If Mubarak does extend peace feelers toward Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as many Mideast experts think he will, he will start with one advantage that Sadat no longer had—goodwill. Sadat was scathing in his attacks on Arab leaders who criticized his peace initiative—"dwarfs," he called them, among other things—and his Arab brethren did not forgive him. "Sadat had a personality problem with their leaders," says J. C. Hurewitz, director of Columbia University's Middle East Institute. "He couldn't get along with Prince Fahd, King Khalid [both of Saudi Arabia] or King Hussein [of Jordan]. Mubarak comes in with a clean slate. He doesn't seem to have those personality differences, and he could repair relations with the Saudis and Jorda-

tional Security Council, believe that at best Mubarak "will move cautiously and perceptively in responding to the overtures of the more pragmatic Arab leaders."

**Key Partner:** For the United States, Egypt's course in the post-Sadat era is a matter of vital importance. Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations made Sadat a key partner in the defense of Western interests in the Middle East—and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf—and Sadat readily upheld his part of the bargain. He offered a "handshake" agreement with Washington to allow the use of an air base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea as an advance staging "facility" for the Rapid Deployment Force. He shipped arms to anti-Soviet guerrillas in Afghanistan and shared intelligence data on Libyan activities. When he died, he was engaged with the United States in a joint plan to thwart Kaddafi's mischief-making in North Africa (box). He publicly support-



gan Administration into a crisis of confidence that stretches far beyond Egypt. Coming close upon the death of the Shah of Iran, the assassination of Sadat may convince moderate leaders in the turbulent Middle East that it is better to maintain some distance from the United States. "The bottom line for a lot of people is the question of who lives and who dies," says one American strategist. "It's hard to argue with that—or with the fact that the Russians' friends are all alive and well while two of ours are dead." The tide of Islamic fundamentalism that swept aside the Shah and cut down Sadat also may push Mubarak in the direction of the Arab consensus, U.S. analysts believe. Doubts in the region about the value of an American connection will do nothing to halt that.

Some Administration officials take an exceedingly gloomy view of the prospects for stability in Egypt in the months to come. They are not altogether reassured or convinced by official statements from Cairo that the plot against Sadat was that of a small group. "The Israelis are not sure Mubarak is the man," says one Haig aide. "And Mubarak is in no position to move quickly on the Sinai. He's hanging by a thread. The extreme right is very strong; he has to keep arresting them or else they will decide he's weak." Administration officials also have decided that Egypt will need a major infusion of U.S. economic aid in order to keep Mubarak in office, though a budget battle has ensued over how much and how soon. Says one proponent of increased U.S. aid: "Egypt is in very bad shape."

**Visits:** Senior State Department officials had hoped to use Sadat's funeral as a springboard for high-level visits with other key Mideast allies, including Sudan, Oman and perhaps Saudi Arabia and Israel. But the plan had to be scuttled: few Arab leaders were eager to meet with a top-drawer American delegation. As a result, Haig planned to return home directly from Cairo, after brief meetings with Mubarak and leading officials from Sudan, Somalia, Oman and Liberia. Other members of Haig's delegation, including State Department counselor Robert McFarlane, planned to make low-profile visits to Khartoum and other turbulent Arab capitals.

Given all the uncertainties in the region, just about everyone seemed inclined to adopt a wait-and-see policy. "It is not a time for bold action by the United States right now," said one Reagan Administration hand. "The United States should reassure its friends in the region while we are working to get our whole Mideast strategy together. We've got a respite now, and we can either squander it or use it to do some heavy thinking." The shock of Sadat's murder may be what finally prompts the Administration to draw up a comprehensive approach to the Middle East.

ANGUS DEMING with JULIAN NUNDY and CHARLES GLASS in Cairo, MILAN J. KUBIC in Jerusalem, THEODORE STANGER in Bonn, JOHN WALCOTT in Washington and bureau reports



## SPECIAL REPORT


# The October Man

Since the October War of 1973, Hosni Mubarak, 53, has been Anwar Sadat's most loyal follower—and only real apprentice. For years he sat in obscurity at his President's side, quietly taking notes. Henry Kissinger once assumed he was a junior aide, only to learn later that he was the Vice President of Egypt. Unlike Sadat, he is quite cautious; like Sadat, he is cagey, direct and self-assured. "He has been very good at surviving in a very tough school of politics," says one diplomat who knows him. "It's up to him now to see if he can do the top job."

Egypt's ambitious new President has spent a lifetime developing the strengths he brings to the Egyptian Presidency. Born in

Egyptian leaders capable of dealing with the Israelis on the basis of equality. In 1975, alarmed by the murder of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, Sadat chose Mubarak as his Vice President and political heir.

At first, Mubarak had little knowledge of government, economics or international affairs. Unlike many high Egyptian officials, he lived modestly with his wife and two sons, was unswervingly punctual and preferred a vigorous game of squash to Cairo's traditional midday nap. He did his homework, remained silent and studiously took down information while Sadat conferred with Egyptian and foreign experts. And over the years, he took on more and more of the day-



Bill Fitz-Patrick—The White House

*Mubarak with Reagan a week before the assassination: 'He knows what power is'*

1928 in the same desperately poor Nile delta province as Sadat, Mubarak graduated from Egypt's military academy at 20, joined the air force and first met Sadat at an El Arish military base in the early 1950s; Sadat was reportedly impressed enough to jot Mubarak's name in a notebook for future reference. Trained as a bomber pilot in the Soviet Union, Mubarak rose to air force chief of staff in 1969. Three years later, Sadat appointed him air force commander.

**Details:** Mubarak's role in planning the 1973 Mideast war propelled him upward in Sadat's inner circle. As air force chief, he mastered minute details: "He knew all his pilots and officers, their fitness, their personal life and professionalism," one close aide recalls. On Oct. 6, 1973, Mubarak launched the surprise air attack against the Israelis, enabling Egyptian ground forces to cross the Suez Canal. For Sadat, Mubarak was a model of what he called the "October generation," a new breed of self-confident

to-day chores of running Egypt. Sadat delegated administrative problems to Mubarak while he contemplated the broader sweep of policy—an arrangement that freed him for his 1977 peace initiative with Israel.

Israelis who have dealt closely with Mubarak regard him as warm, frank and gritty: "He's a man who knows what power is and how to manipulate it," says a former aide to Menachem Begin. His manner is straightforward. "He doesn't need to believe in playing people off against each other," says Egypt's former Information Minister Mansour Hassan. "But he is cunning if he needs be." Mubarak faces an enormous challenge in taking over a government built around his flamboyant predecessor. But, as he confidently told a reporter last week, Egypt boasts seven thousand years of civilization—and it was the Egyptians who invented government in the first place.

FAY WILLEY with JULIAN NUNDY in Cairo and bureau reports



# A Talk With Mubarak

Late last week NEWSWEEK'S Mideast bureau chief Julian Nundy and Rome bureau chief Elaine Sciolino interviewed Egypt's new leader, Hosni Mubarak. Below, his recollections of the murder of Anwar Sadat, and his plans for the future:

**NEWSWEEK:** *We'd like to ask you about your last minutes with President Sadat, that hour and a half you spent sitting next to him.*

**MUBARAK:** I and the Minister of Defense went to the President, we went with him in the car to the general headquarters of the armed forces, then to the place of the parade, and this is what happened on that day: we sat at our places there, we started to see the show and we discussed what we were going to do on the 25th of April [when Israel is due to return the remainder of the Sinai], because, you know, President Sadat was always thinking what kind of ceremony he wanted. He was telling me about some things that could be done and how we could do it. While the show was passing, it was giving him new ideas.

**Q. What were his last words to you?**

**A.** He said, "I have decided to promote some officers who participated in the October war."

**Q. What was the President's mood that day?**

**A.** He was very pleased that day. You cannot imagine—it was one of his best moments. Always on Oct. 6 he feels it was his decision and his action and a result of his action that he gained back occupied territory.

**Q. Tell us how the tragedy happened.**

**A.** I really didn't see the tragedy. I was looking up to see the air show until I heard noise and a small explosion. I saw the President standing up. Whenever he stands we have to stand, and in a second I just saw the image of someone throwing something. I was pushed away and I tried to push the President down. Other people tried but he resisted. He couldn't believe that such an event could happen. For us this is the first time in our history... We're not used to such things. He used to go to every celebration in an open car and go among the people.

**Q. Did you see the President die?**

**A.** I saw him when he was shot at the parade. I saw then that he was finished. I

went to his operating room and I met Jihan [Sadat] there and told her, "The doctors are doing their best in the operating room." She waited in a room next to the operating room. Then one of the doctors came out and said, "It's a hopeless case." I was shocked.

**Q. How will your personal style differ from that of Sadat?**

**A.** I think there may be some differences in the person, that's all. It doesn't mean that there will be any change in the policy at all. The goals and the objectives are precise and the style doesn't matter.

**Q. Will Sadat's enemies be your enemies?**

**A.** That depends on their attitude, or



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Man of the hour: Mubarak announcing the death of Sadat

how they are going to react. I am not going to start out with any enemies at all.

**Q. Were you disappointed that some Arab leaders attacked Sadat even after his tragic death and that some others did not send their condolences?**

**A.** It saddens. It leaves a sour taste. Everybody's going to die, so condolences should be sent, even between enemies. Do you remember when we had bad relations with the United States at the time of Nasser? When Nasser died [in 1970] the U.S. sent a delegation to participate at the funeral. When any bad things happen in the Arab world, we send our condolences right away.

**Q. What is the future of the Camp David peace process?**

**A.** Camp David is Camp David. We are going to respect our word, the peace treaty and normalization. There has been

speculation that after the return of Sinai there will be a new policy. We don't intend to do such a thing at all.

**Q. Is there any policy priority that you now see as essential?**

**A.** I have nothing new. We are going to continue the same policies. We are going to go on. It is a matter of continuation. I worked with President Sadat for quite a long time and participated in all his decisions and all the measures he put. After the inauguration, I think there will be nothing new.

**Q. So you foresee absolutely no policy changes either interior or external?**

**A.** None at all. Not at all.

**Q. Do you think there's any possibility of an early rapprochement with any Arab countries?**

**A.** I think it's too early to speak about this now. I think it is better to wait and see. We didn't do anything with the Arab world. They froze relations with us. We didn't start such measures. They started it. Then, the initiative should be from their own side.

**Q. President Sadat had such a special relationship with the United States over the years. Do you think as President you will be harder on the United States than Sadat was?**

**A.** Where do you get that impression? We are very frank with your Administration. We always say if we disagree or not. But why would I be tougher now? The only thing I'm critical of with the Administration is the AWACS. Why don't you give them to the Saudis? They are your closest friends. They raised their production of oil for you. They didn't raise oil prices for you... Then you don't give them AWACS to defend their country and your interest in this area. This policy should make all your friends have a big question mark when you refuse this to your closest friend. What are you going to do with your other friends then?

**Q. If you could do one thing during your own rule of Egypt, if you have one dream for your country, what would it be?**

**A.** All I dream of now is of continuing President Sadat's Administration. We can turn the country green, we can find the homes for our people, we can finish the peace process and see our land returned to us. But truthfully, I haven't yet the time to think over such things.



# The Man Who Took Risks

All his life Anwar Sadat flirted with danger. His courage was another name for a kind of reckless self-assurance that was the key to his success. He took desperate chances as a young man, plotting against King Farouk and the colonial domination of Great Britain. As President, Sadat infuriated the Soviet Union when he abruptly threw 18,000 Soviet military personnel out of Egypt. He took the destiny of Egypt and the world into his hands when he hurled 45,000 Egyptian soldiers against Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973. The risks he took for peace outdid his risks in war: in 1977, defying the wrath of most of his fellow Arabs, he traveled to Jerusalem, the heart of his enemy's camp, and so began the unfinished march to a Mideast peace.

The force of his personality and boldness of his vision seemed magnified by the fact that they were so little anticipated. Among Egyptian officials he was the butt of jokes for years, and was called Gamal Abdel Nasser's "poodle" and "flunky"; virtually no world leader took him very seriously when he succeeded Nasser as President in 1970. But Sadat outwitted a pro-Soviet plot against him and consolidated his power in quick strokes. His surprise attack across the Suez Canal in 1973 punched the Israelis back for a time, spoiling the image of Israeli invincibility. His performances in Jerusalem and at Camp David shattered a more insidious myth: that Arabs and Israelis could never negotiate face to face. In 1978 Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize with another old conspirator turned statesman: Menachem Begin.

**Egyptian Martyrs:** The son of an Egyptian clerk and his part-Sudanese wife, Sadat was born on Christmas Day in 1918—the year the War in Europe ended and the year Egypt demanded in vain total independence from Britain. Sadat spent his early childhood in the Nile delta village of Mit Abul Kom, where his grandmother nurtured him on stories about Egyptian martyrs and British oppression. A religious child, Sadat attended both Muslim and Coptic Christian schools. When he was 7 he moved with his parents and thirteen brothers and sisters to Cairo. He spent the rest of his life yearning

for the peaceful life of the peasant village. "The feeling that I am a peasant gives me rare self-sufficiency," he wrote in his autobiography, an exercise in introspection which he titled "In Search of Identity."

Sadat was expelled from secondary school for taking part in anti-British riots in 1935, but he managed, through a connection of his father's, to join the Royal Military Academy at the age of 18. After

"armed revolution against the British presence in Egypt."

Sadat's first serious experiment in subversion ended disastrously. At 22, he tumbled into an unfortunate intrigue with two half-comical German spies. The secret agents spent their evenings leering at the dancers in a Cairo nightclub called the Kit-Kat, while by day they made halfhearted efforts to send messages to their leaders. Sadat tried, through this pair, to relay a message to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, whose tanks at that time were rolling through North Africa. His intent was to inform Rommel of the support the Free Officers' Organization was willing to give the Germans, in exchange for promises of Egyptian independence. But British intelligence arrested the two incompetent spies; they in turn fingered Sadat. Detained in 1942 under wartime martial law, Sadat sat in Egyptian prisons for two years; he escaped in 1944.

**Inner Calm:** Sadat turned to terrorism. In January 1946 he and a small group plotted the assassination of Amin Osman, an Egyptian official who was chairman of a passionately pro-British political party called the Revival League. The group's gunman, tracked down by police, confessed; once again Sadat was implicated. He spent most of the next three years of his life in jail, often in solitary confinement. Years later he credited his sense of inner calm and self-reliance to the time he did in Cell 54 at Cairo Central Prison. During this stretch he decided to end his first marriage, which had been arranged by relatives, to a village girl. "Nothing is more

important than self-knowledge," he once said in recalling those years. "Once I had come to know what I wanted, and got rid of what I didn't, I was reconciled to my 'self'."

After his release in 1948 Sadat managed to re-enlist in the army—and he at once rejoined the underground. Under Nasser, the Free Officers had become an army within the army. On July 21, 1952, Nasser urgently summoned Sadat to Cairo. The next day Sadat arrived in the city in the late afternoon and, with his wife Jihan—an 18-year-old half-English girl educated at a French *lycée*—he went to the movies. When he returned, a note from Nasser informed



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*Sadat in the desert: Unbelievable patience and existential detachment*

graduation he was assigned to the Signals Corps and was sent to Mankabad, a remote garrison town where he fell in with a moody and aloof lieutenant named Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat, Nasser and eight others sat around army campfires together discussing revolution; they founded the Free Officers' Organization, a band that Sadat described as a "secret revolutionary society dedicated to the task of liberation." Emboldened by Hitler's threat to the British, the Free Officers' group expanded between 1939 and 1941, gradually gaining the allegiance of many junior and senior officers. Its goal, Sadat wrote, was





With President Nixon in Alexandria, 1974

Simonpietri—Sygma



Rachad el Koussy—Sygma

With Henry Kissinger in Cairo, 1980



## Please Call Me Anwar

*In the aftershock of the assassination, the friends of the world turned to their memories, summoning up anecdotes rich with his audacity, doggedness and hairpin-turn surprises. A few glimpses:*

In 1970, on the day Nasser died of a heart attack, Henry Kissinger surveyed the list of possible successors and pronounced them all "second-raters." He predicted a period of collective leadership, a swing to the left, the possibility that a military strongman might emerge. Whoever takes charge, said Kissinger, "can hardly begin a new regime by making peace with Israel." He later acknowledged that his underestimate of Sadat had been one of his greatest miscalculations.

In 1972, after expelling the Soviets, Sadat sent Kissinger a "long and extremely subtle" message disclaiming any expectation of having earned special treatment by having made the startling move. "It was all, as I would come to realize, vintage Sadat," Kissinger recalled in his memoirs ("White House Years"). "His negotiating tactic was never to haggle over detail but to create an atmosphere that made disagreement psychologically difficult. . . . I cannot say that I fully understood Sadat's insight then. Great men are so rare that they take some getting used to."

Eighteen months after Sadat's Jerusalem visit in 1977, Israel's Moshe Dayan finally seized a chance to ask Sadat why he had made the daring overture. In his memoirs of the visit ("Breakthrough") Dayan recalls that Sadat told him: "I was searching for something that would pro-

duce shock waves, positive ones. . . . I said to myself: Israel has security problems, and she is sheltering behind them, and demanding direct face-to-face negotiations. Very well, I will go myself, meet directly and alone—I and Israel."

At Sadat's first meeting in Alexandria with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the two men sat by the Mediterranean discussing the prospects for peace. Sadat suddenly paused, looked at the beautiful sunset and said: "Enough of this 'Mr. President' here and 'Mr. Prime Minister' there. From now on, you're for me 'Menachem,' and I for you, 'Anwar.'" They became close enough to exchange personal notes: Sadat sent Begin a message congratulating him on the birth of a grandson; Begin congratulated Jihan Sadat when she won her master's degree.

When Sadat visited Jerusalem, Begin gave him a tie as a personal present. When Begin in turn visited Cairo, he gave Sadat a second tie. On their third meeting at Camp David, Sadat was sporting the first of his two gift ties. "So what's wrong?" asked Begin, shaking hands. "You don't like the second tie?"

Sadat's patience impressed all those who shared the frustrations of the Camp David negotiations. Time and again he agreed to anguishing concessions with "almost existential detachment," as one participant recalls, while "Begin insisted on every comma, every word." Once, a breaking point was reached. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance remembers telling President Carter that Sadat, in despair, had decided to go home. "We were both stunned," says Vance. "It was a



Moreau—Sygma

Welcoming the dying Shah to Egypt, 1980

crushing thought." Carter pleaded with Sadat, alone, and finally persuaded him to keep struggling on. "For Sadat, peace was paramount," explains Vance. "He decided that despite all the difficulties, he would see it through."

Shortly after the 1979 raid on Mecca's Grand Mosque by Muslim extremists, Sadat and Begin met at Sadat's winter home in Aswan. "We were sitting at the pool on an island in the middle of the Nile," Begin recalls. "Sadat clapped his hands and ordered an aide to bring him a map. He spread it on the ground and ran his finger from one country to the next. 'Look at this, Menachem,' he said. 'Here is Afghanistan in the Russian camp. Here is South Yemen, Iraq, Syria—all tied with the Russians. Here is Ethiopia and Libya. The same problems. The Russians are all around us, like a Red Sea.' I looked at the map and asked, 'Anwar, is Israel there?' And he just chuckled and put his finger on this tiny dot next to Egypt and replied, 'For sure, Menachem, we are in the same boat.'"





Pictorial Parade

ning a pact with Kaddafi, 1971



Karel—Sygma

Enjoying a laugh with Menachem Begin at Camp David, 1978



AP

th Reagan at the White House in August

Sadat met the Rev. Jesse Jackson, head of Chicago's Operation PUSH, during Jackson's controversial trip to the Middle East in 1979. The first thing he said was "Rev. Jackson, may I call you Jesse?" When Jackson agreed, Sadat went on: "I am a black man. I am sensitive to the role of Egypt in the civilization of man, and I am committed to the economic advancement of my people and the liberation of the Palestinians. . . . I've been able to do with my head what I've never been able to do with guns."

After Sadat offered refuge to the dying Shah of Iran, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, asked him why he was risking certain vilification from fellow Arabs. Replied Sadat in astonishment: "I don't understand you. He was my friend. Of course I will give him sanctuary."

Sadat needed "long periods of silence and reflection," recalls Hermann Eilts, who served as U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 1973 to 1979. At his summer retreat near the Libyan border, Sadat, dressed in

loose pajamas, once told Eilts, " 'I have to think about something very quietly.' Hesat there puffing on his pipe, the smell of sweet tobacco flooding the room, and I didn't know whether to leave or stay." After 45 minutes of rumination, Sadat resumed the conversation.

First he called her Miss Walters. Then it became Bar-ba-ra. About a year ago, Anwar Sadat switched to "Barb," says ABC's Barbara Walters, recalling Sadat as her most charismatic interviewee: "He just jumped off the screen." He also "sweated profusely even when calm," began every paragraph with "for sure" and liked to joke about his humble origins. "He would tell me he was a 'poor man' and would tease me about my salary. I would tease him about his Presidential mansions."

Sadat offered Richard Nixon a glorious welcome to Egypt and a few days' respite from the tangles of Watergate. In his memoirs ("RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon"), Nixon recalls sharing with Sadat his pet theory about China's hostility to the Soviet Union. He told Sadat that the Chinese considered themselves superior and more civilized than the Russians. Sadat smiled and said, "You know, that's exactly the same way we feel: we Egyptians are more civilized than the Russians."

"He trusted his own intuitive judgment," says longtime Mideast peace negotiator Sol Linowitz. "He walked to his own drummer with sure footsteps." Linowitz remembers the day he delivered an important agreement from Begin. All indications pointed to Sadat's rejecting the step as premature. Instead, Sadat told the startled Linowitz, "That's excellent. We'll announce it. Everybody in my government will be against it, but I know it's right."

Sadat's disdain for technicalities was such a legend that an aide once told a friend: "Our main job is to protect the boss from details." In one of the negotiating marathons that followed Camp David, diplomats spent weeks quibbling over the nomenclature of the settlement they were trying to reach. Should it be called a "peace treaty" or a mere "agreement"? The negotiators finally raised the question with Sadat. He checked with an adviser at his side, established in short order that there was no legal difference between the terms and immediately decreed: "Then we'll have a treaty, because that's what the Israelis want."

Theodore Sorensen, the former Kennedy White House aide who has served as Sadat's U.S. lawyer in connection with book rights and other interests, sat with him a year ago under a favorite banyan tree at Sadat's home north of Cairo. Asked by Sorensen if he ever feared for his life, Sadat replied, "I walked the entire route of the Shah's funeral. No other leader could do that." Sadat accompanied the answer with one of his most characteristic gestures: arms spread wide in fatalism. When Barbara Walters questioned Sadat in the same vein, he answered, "I will not die one hour before my time."

Maurice Bloth from University City, Mo., wrote Sadat last June to ask for one of his old pipes. It would be used, Bloth explained, as a symbol of peace in a membership drive by his B'nai B'rith chapter. Bloth received a brand-new English Dunhill valued at \$200 along with a personal letter expressing Sadat's "great pleasure and appreciation" at being so honored. After Sadat's murder, Bloth said, "I felt like it happened to me."

ELIZABETH PEER with JANE WHITMORE in Washington, SUSAN AGREST in New York and bureau reports



## SPECIAL REPORT



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*Sinai: Reviewing Egyptian troops a year after the Yom Kippur war*



Henri Bureau—Sygma

*Jerusalem: With Menachem Begin on Sadat's historic trip to Israel in 1977*



Wally McNamee—NEWSWEEK

*Camp David: With Jimmy Carter and Begin at the White House to announce the accords*

him that the revolution had already started. Sadat took charge of the abdication of King Farouk, who left Alexandria harbor on July 26 aboard the royal yacht, *Mahroussa*. "From the bridge of a destroyer," he recalled, "I watched Farouk pass into the twilight of history."

Sadat rose to power only gradually during the subsequent years of Nasser's turbulent rule. For many years he served in a minor post as head of Nasser's Islamic Congress. During his early years as an organizer of the Free Officers, Sadat had maintained friendly ties with Hassan al Banna, the Supreme Guide of a fundamentalist religious organization called the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood members fought alongside Nasser against the British, but they later disapproved of Nasser's worldly socialism and tried to kill him. Nasser arrested the leaders and gave Sadat the task of redirecting the brotherhood into a tamer Islamic revivalist movement. His success was mixed at best, and he made enemies who dogged him for the rest of his life.

**Police State:** Sadat was unswervingly loyal to Nasser. One early joke that circulated in Cairo was that the dark spot on Sadat's forehead came not from years of devout Muslim prayers but from the many Cabinet meetings in which Nasser had hit Sadat to make sure he understood what was being said. By 1970 Nasser had pushed aside all the original leaders of the revolution—except for Sadat. When Nasser died of a heart attack that year, Egypt's military commanders approved Sadat's accession to power, believing he would be easy to manipulate. In 1971 Sadat jailed most of them, claiming they had conspired with the Soviet Union to bring him down. He quickly consolidated his power, winning popularity with ordinary Egyptians by dismantling some of the worst devices of Nasser's police state.

From the beginning Sadat surprised the world with his willingness to break Arab taboos about Israel. In 1971 he suddenly offered to negotiate a peace treaty with the Israelis, going far beyond Nasser in coming to terms with the existence of the Jewish state. His terms were stiff: he demanded as a precondition that Israel settle the Palestine refugee problem and withdraw to pre-1967 borders. But he took a radical step forward when he told a U.N. special envoy that Egypt was prepared to recognize Israel's "territorial and political integrity." The sudden sign of Arab flexibility provided a new public-relations problem for Prime Minister Golda Meir, who for years had found it easy to prove to the United States and Europe that the Arabs were more intransigent than Israel.

For a year Sadat talked peace while badgering the Soviets for weapons. Under Nasser, Moscow had become Egypt's chief military benefactor; by 1972 the Soviets had 18,000 military personnel in Egypt. Sadat



## SPECIAL REPORT

argued that he needed more weapons before he could issue Israel an ultimatum: bargain or fight. But the Soviets had little interest in another Mideast showdown. President Richard Nixon traveled to Moscow in pursuit of détente, and the Soviets—still staggered by Egypt's vast losses in 1967—tended to agree to a U.S.-proposed "relaxation" of the Middle East military buildup. Enraged by the way Moscow ignored him, Sadat made a spectacular announcement:

she did in 1967." Sadat was determined to prove Kissinger's realpolitik wrong and to expunge the shame of the 1967 defeat. Only after regaining their pride, he reasoned, could the Arabs make peace with Israel.

**Enormous Victory:** The Soviets had restrained Sadat's hand. Without them, he felt free to wage war. On Oct. 6, 1973—while Israelis fasted on the Jewish high holy day of Yom Kippur—Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel. At first the Israelis boasted to the Arabs, "We shall crush your bones." But they also appealed

sad talked the most radical members of the group out of a proposal to return to war with Israel. The summit also approved a continuation of the 1973 oil embargo against the nations supporting Israel, voted to designate the Palestine Liberation Organization the "sole" representative of the Palestinians and agreed to a peace conference in Geneva to be sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It appeared that Sadat's war had accomplished the impossible: the Arabs were acting in unity.

Sadat tried to convert the skeptical Syrians, Saudis and Jordanians to his old theory that only the United States had the clout to secure concessions from Israel. But it gradually became clear to him that he had counted too heavily on the Americans to produce a comprehensive settlement. He knew, too, that he had overestimated Egypt's influence in the rest of the Arab world. By 1975, President Assad of Syria, his personal friend and chief ally, broke with him—angered that Israel was returning more land to Egypt than to Syria under the disengagement agreements negotiated through the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. As Arab unity dissolved, Sadat became more realistic—and more devoted to settling scores alone with Israel.

If pride over the 1973 war nourished Egyptian spirits, it never cured the country's real hunger. Sadat later conceded that he had waged the war in part to divert his people from their poverty and the nation's economic woes. Nor did the situation improve after the war; a rise in food prices in January 1977 prompted massive rioting in the streets of Cairo and in all other major Egyptian cities. Stunned, Sadat turned from international affairs to the domestic scene. On Egyptian television, he played the disciplinarian—a heavy-handed role his admirers abroad rarely noticed. "I am not scared," he said. "I always have a pistol by my side." But more than ever he saw the need to divert resources away from war to heal Egypt's crippled economy.

**Grand Gesture:** Egypt's rapprochement with Israel began with a vision in Sadat's mind: he saw himself praying in the Al Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem. For Sadat—a natural actor and master of the grand gesture—the decision was made on the spot; the rest was only timing. Fellow Arabs at first believed he had lost his senses when he informed the Egyptian People's Assembly that he would go "to the ends of the earth," even to the Israeli Knesset, for peace. But Begin took him at his word and extended an invitation. "This man is either truly great or he is mad," one of Sadat's aides said just before the President left for Jerusalem. "Everyone will know he is great if he succeeds. Only his friends will know he is great if he fails."

Sadat was certain of his own greatness. "I am Egypt," he said. "I am going to Jerusalem and others will have to fall in line." The motive may have been simple hubris, or a "pharaoh complex," as one diplomat called it. But many years earlier, in Cell 54, Sadat



Camera Press



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AP



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*Clockwise from top left: Sadat in the army in 1940, with Nasser in 1952, in the dock as anti-British plotter in 1948, with Leonid Brezhnev in 1971*

he told all Russian troops to clear out of Egypt immediately.

At first Sadat denied his quarrel with the Soviets was a prelude to a new alliance with the United States. "This is a matter between me and the Soviets and does not concern anyone else," he snapped. But he began to stress the view that only the United States could make Israel give up the occupied territories. In a letter, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger complimented Sadat for his "remarkable actions," but also warned that Egypt was in no position to dictate peace terms to the more powerful Israelis. If Egypt attacked, Kissinger said, Israel would "score an even greater victory than

for U.S. military supplies to replace heavy losses. The Israelis counterattacked and threw Egypt and Syria back; with the Egyptian Army encircled on the west bank of the Suez, the United States and Soviet Union helped negotiate a cease-fire. Militarily, the Arabs had been defeated. Psychologically, they had scored an enormous victory.

After the October war, the Arab world rallied, briefly, around Sadat. In November 1973 conservative sheiks and radicals from sixteen Arab nations gathered in Algiers to listen respectfully to Sadat's ideas for a comprehensive peace settlement. At the meeting, Sadat and Syria's President Hafez As-



# 'We Can Topple the Cairo Regime'

**INTERVIEW: SAADEDDIN SHAZLI**

Saadeddin Shazli, 60, a former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army, calls himself the leader of Egypt's political opposition. Shazli was fired from his military post by Anwar Sadat in 1973 and now operates from Algeria. After Sadat's assassination, Shazli spoke with NEWSWEEK'S Scott Sullivan by telephone from a temporary base in Libya. Excerpts:

**SULLIVAN: Who killed President Anwar Sadat?**

**SHAZLI:** You know that I have already said that I cannot discuss that.

**Q. How do you feel about Sadat's murder?**

**A.** I am happy. I am full of joy. But Sadat was not our main target. The target is Egypt's autocratic regime. Getting rid of Sadat is a step in the right direction, but there is much more to be done.

**Q. Who opposes what you call Egypt's "autocratic regime"?**

**A.** No one can say for certain, because there is no democracy in the country. There are no free newspapers, no access to the media and all opposition political parties are outlawed. From the fact that Sadat himself ordered the arrest of 5,000 "opposition leaders" you can get an idea of the numbers. [The official Egyptian figure is 1,536.] What I can tell you is that the opposition to the regime extends from the extreme right to the extreme left with many in between. It includes Nasserites, Marxists, liberals and the fundamentalist Al Tagfir wal Hijra (Atonement and Flight) group.

**Q. What unites these groups?**

**A.** The thing that holds us together is the idea of democracy, the idea of toppling Sadat. We want to get rid of the autocratic regime, restore free speech, free press and hold real elections.

**Q. If the opposition were to take power, would it remain united?**

**A.** Each group would come out on its own and form its own party, and each one will have the share of power it gets in elections.

**Q. That sounds like a fine democratic aim, but you are taking violent means to achieve it. How do you justify that?**

**A.** What else can we do? I don't approve of violence, but the regime of Sadat and Mubarak leaves us no choice. I ask you sincerely, how can there be peaceful opposition with all these repressive laws? How can we express ourselves? Of course, we believe that the best way to establish democracy is



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Shazli: 'Camp David was a sideshow'

by democratic means. What you are seeing now in Egypt is self-defense by the opposition. We have been forced into it.

**Q. Does the army support you?**

**A.** You must remember that the army is made up of the sons of the people, sons of farmers and workers, of educated people, too. When the time comes for them to stand up for the people, I believe they will make the right choice.

**Q. When will that time come? In weeks or months?**

**A.** No one can say. The army's attitude is the decisive factor.

**Q. What are the opposition groups' connections with Libya?**

**A.** Our relations with Libya are no better than those we have with Syria, Aden or the Palestine Liberation Organization. We have excellent relations with all of the members of the steadfast front. Remember, I live in Algiers. If I have come here to Libya at this time, it is because there is a common border; Libya is closer to Egypt than Algeria is.

**Q. Would you accept Kaddafi's military aid to attack the regime in Egypt?**

**A.** I do not support the invasion of one Arab country by another. I believe we can topple the regime from inside.

**Q. Is the repudiation of the Camp**

**David agreements a basic aim of your movement?**

**A.** We believe Camp David was a sideshow. If there had been democracy in Egypt, Camp David would never have had a chance. Sadat organized a referendum on the subject, but the vote was rigged. Candidates for Parliament had to express support for the Camp David agreements or lose the nomination of the only political party in the country.

**Q. What will happen to the Camp David accords if your group comes to power in Egypt?**

**A.** We will ask the Egyptian people why they support the Camp David accords and why they oppose them. There will be a national debate where everyone can express himself, then in a few weeks we will ask the people to vote.

**Q. Would you accept continuation of the Camp David peace agreement if the people approved it?**

**A.** Yes, if they voted for it in a free election after a clear national debate.

**Q. What do you think about Hosni Mubarak?**

**A.** I gave Mubarak a chance. I said publicly I did not consider him responsible for all the mistakes of Sadat. I laid down three conditions: the immediate release of the political prisoners, the end of "martial law" and a freeze on Sadat's repressive laws. Now you see what Mubarak has done. He scheduled the election this week just three days after Sadat's funeral. I ask you: Is that democracy?

**Q. What are your immediate plans?**

**A.** I will go back to Algiers. We will continue to struggle, to make contact with the Egyptian people. We will do all we can to topple the regime.

**Q. Will you and your allies set up a government-in-exile?**

**A.** I don't exclude that. But it is not settled yet. We wanted to wait and see how Mubarak behaves.

**Q. Now you've seen.**

**A.** Yes, Mubarak did not give us a chance.

**Q. Do you have a message for the American people?**

**A.** Yes. I ask them: Do you think the Mubarak regime is democratic or not? If not, why does the United States continue to support autocratic regimes abroad when it goes on talking about democracy at home?