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and bring your hearts together"*  
—ARAB PROVERB

# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

Robert Vickrey

EGYPT'S  
NASSER



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TIME, MARCH 29, 1963

## A letter from the PUBLISHER

Bernhard M. Auer

THE man who covers the Middle East for TIME must be a correspondent with his suitcase always packed, habituated to many small cups of sweet, strong coffee, tolerant of camels and Jeeps, and ready to entrust himself constantly to planes that have varying degrees of reliability. His area covers more than 5,000,000 sq. mi., or almost half as much again as the U.S. Middle East Bureau Chief George de Carvalho has seen a great deal of it in recent weeks, and though this adds up to a lot of sand in his eye, he has had the spur of a news story that has come alive in half a dozen spots at once.

Before the revolution in Iraq, De Carvalho hid himself to the fighting in Yemen, where he went deeper into royalist territory than any other U.S. correspondent. It was rough going, at a "tropic latitude and a mountain altitude," with nights freezing and days burning. It wasn't only the peril of dodging Egyptian fire; once, miles from the front, a bullet whizzed by, and then as he flattened himself, another. Out from the brush, rifle in hand, came a woman. "I thought he was an Egyptian," she said. Among the *galabiya*-wearing Yemeni, only Egyptians are known to wear pants, and "your trousered correspondent" became an obvious target. De Carvalho emerged after 23 days in Yemen with a vivid story (TIME, March 8), establishing that the battle for Yemen was not going as Cairo said it was. Last week De Carvalho was in Jordan, reporting for our Nasser cover, and at the palace was greeted with a grin by King Hussein: "You scared us with those reports we got of your death in Yemen."

To help out with the cover reporting, TIME's Bonn Bureau Chief James Bell flew out to Cairo to interview Nasser. To call Bell an old Middle East hand is to limit him geographi-



GEORGE DE CARVALHO



JAMES BELL

cally: he is an old Far East hand, an old Africa hand and an old German hand, as well as being a far-from-old and far-from-home Kansan. Back in the days when the young Egyptian army officer overthrew King Farouk's corrupt regime, Bell was the first correspondent to discover and report that the real head of the junta was not Mohammed Naguib, but an unknown colonel named Nasser. Now, seeing Nasser for the first time in nine years, Bell methodically noted his grey temples and greying hair and a figure as trim as ever. Weight? Nasser laughed: "I don't think anyone has asked me that since the last time you did. I think it's 85 kilos [187 lbs.]. And I think I'm still 182 centimeters [6 ft.] tall."

THERE were other TIME correspondents traveling to faraway places for stories in this issue. From New Delhi, James Shepherd made his way to Sikkim's remote capital of Gangtok to see the charming wedding of the Crown Prince to his American bride, Hope Cooke. Everyone was invited to lunch, and 5,000 came. Outsiders were introduced to chang, a "barley beer that works something like an atomic reactor," reports Shepherd, and is drunk through long, hollow bamboo tubes. Sikkimese were equally awed by being introduced to martinis.

Off to Costa Rica with President Kennedy to report his triumphant visit went two members of our Washington bureau, Jerry Hannifin, an old Latin American hand, and William Rademaekers, our new State Department correspondent.

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## MIDDLE EAST

### The Camel Driver

(See Cover)

At 6:30 one morning early this month, a phone shrilled in the small office off the bedroom of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Already awake, he lifted the receiver to hear exciting news: a military coup had just been launched against the anti-Nasser government of Syria. The phone rang again. It was the Minister of Culture and National Guidance. How should Radio Cairo handle the Syrian crisis? Support the rebels, snapped Nasser.

Then Egypt's boss rapped out a succession of telephoned commands. To the air force: alert the bombers and fighters in case the Syrian rebels call for help. To the navy (six destroyers and ten submarines): steam northward and await orders. To the army: prepare to move in case the Israelis might be thinking of intervention; place missiles on launch pads ready to fire.

This done, Nasser finished dressing and went downstairs. The phone rang again, long distance from Baghdad. President Abdul Salam Aref, who only four weeks before had overthrown another anti-Nasser regime in Iraq, solicitously asked what Nasser intended doing about Syria. Nasser said that he would recognize a rebel government as soon as it was formed. Aref delicately responded that of course, Egypt should be the first state to grant recognition, promised that Iraq would follow suit five minutes later.

**Limb from Limb.** Since the Syrian coup was both swift and successful, Nasser's nerves and the Egyptian army were not put to the test. Israel alerted its border defenses but made no further move. On the surface, in fact, the Syrian affair was much milder and less bloody than most Arab revolts. In the past 15 years, the Middle East has been continually shaken like a kaleidoscope, constantly falling into new patterns. There have been two sizable wars and fully two dozen armed uprisings and rebellions. Premiers and princes have been torn limb from limb by street mobs; thousands of politicians and army officers have been killed by hanging, beheading, firing squads and assassins; and swarms of students, workers and tribesmen have been mowed down by machine guns and bombs.

It was quite clear last week that the latest shake of the kaleidoscope resulted in new patterns and alignments overwhelmingly favorable to Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Syrian revolution was the third in six months by rebels pledged to make common cause with Egypt. Flights of new leaders poured into Cairo for tear-stained embraces with Nasser and night-long conferences on the future course of that misty concept called Arab unity. Nasser stands at the pinnacle of prestige, if not of power, and the shadow he casts has never been longer. Today, it falls over the entire Arab world from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.

**Matter of Sabotage?** For the first time in 500 years, the three key Arab states of Egypt, Iraq and Syria have a similar political posture and are on close and friendly terms. The new crowd in primitive Yemen, where 28,000 Egyptian troops are propping up still another pro-Nasser rebellion, is eager to join any alliance that can be hammered out. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan—close friends of the West but hated enemies of the Arab nationalists—face the threat of uprisings at the hands of powerful local friends of the man in Cairo. When King Saud's private Comet



PICTORIAL PARADE

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER  
Casting a 3,000-mile shadow.

plane, equipped with a royal throne, crashed last week against an Italian mountain, killing all 18 aboard, the Saudi Arabs automatically assumed that it had been sabotaged by Nasser agents.

Maybe it was and maybe it was not. In the swirling Middle East struggle, Cairo would flex its muscles where it could. The successful coups in Yemen, Syria and Iraq were no surprise to Gamal Abdel Nasser. He knew they were coming, if not precisely when and how. He knew the conspirators involved in each, though he claims to have pulled no strings. Cairo is thickly populated by exiles from every corner of the Arab world, ranging from Syria's tough Abdul Hamid Serraj, who originally failed Nasser in Damascus, to obscure Tunisians, Yemenis, Saudis, Jordanians and refugees from the British-backed sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. Many of them live well on Egyptian subsidies. Former Saudi Petroleum Minister

Abdullah Tariki is in and out of Cairo frequently, helping organize arms shipments to Saudi Arabian dissidents by air and across the long, empty border with Kuwait. Nasser has won over Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to West Germany, who resigned a fortnight ago in protest at his country's failure to institute reforms. At least six other Saudi ambassadors are sympathetic to Nasser's cause.

**Accented Voice.** All the Arab world is influenced by Nasser's genius as a propagandist. Rising to share Cairo's skyline with the huge dome of the Mohammed Ali mosque is a forest of transmitting antennas that carry Radio Cairo's message to all the world. Cairo's voice bears many accents. There is the overt Voice of the Arabs, and a whole concatenation of "Voices" (Voice of the Arab Nation, Free Voice of Iran, Voice of Free Africa, etc.), which bleat incitement to rebellion with no identification of their Egyptian origin. The transmitting complex is elaborate and devilishly clever. Recently, Somali-language transmissions have supported the claims of Somalia to a portion of northeast Kenya, while Swahili broadcasts aimed at Kenya denounce the idea. A U.S. construction firm is building a new transmitter, which will be beamed at Tunisia and aimed at destroying President Habib Bourguiba.

Egyptian TV, the liveliest in the Middle East, manages to keep three channels busy 20 hours a day, while kinescopes subtly loaded with Nasser propaganda are shipped out to Algeria, Kuwait and Lebanon. Nasser has collected the best entertainers in the Arab world, and uses them superbly. When Um Kalsoum sings *We Revolutionists*, the Bedouins in the desert are deeply stirred. One of the most popular songs among Arab kids is *How We Build the High Dam at Aswan*. Every transistor radio in the Middle East is a Nasser agent. When Yemen revolted against the Imam, Nasser sent them arms and transistors. Arab Communists who broadcast long, windy speeches from Bulgaria have not a chance against Nasser's entertainers.

**Fire Striker.** But Nasser's triumphs are not solely the result of subversion and pop singers. His very example is an inspiration. He has been the uncontested ruler of Egypt for almost a decade, ever since February 1954, when he put down a revolt of cavalry officers and consolidated his regime. During that time, the old political remnants such as the Wafdists have disappeared and even been forgotten. It is Nasser whose personality stands above all others in Egypt and the Arab world, and no other name strikes fire like his. He is hailed as the man who destroyed Egypt's corrupt past and gave Arabs a new dignity. His picture, with its Pepsodent smile, is found in every corner of the Middle East, from Iraqi bazaars to the huts of royalist Yemeni tribesmen who still cling to Nasser's picture even though they are fighting Nasser's troops.

# THE ARAB WORLD


What Nasser has working for him is the deep desire of all Arabs to be united in a single Arab nation, and their conviction—grudging or enthusiastic—that Nasser represents the best hope of achieving it. This dream of unity harks back to the golden age of the 7th century when spurred by the messianic Moslem religion handed down by Mohammed the Prophet, Arab warriors burst from their desert peninsula and conquered everything in sight. In less than 150 years, the Arabs swept victoriously north to Asia Minor and the walls of Byzantine Constantinople, south over Persia and Afghanistan to the heart of India, east through Central Asia to the borders of China, west over Egypt and Africa to Spain and southern France. It was an incredible empire—larger than any carved out by Alexander the Great or Imperial Rome.

It was also an empire that fell swiftly apart. By the 16th century, the Arab states, one by one, fell to the Ottomans and passed into the long sleep of Turkish domination. Then, in World War I, Arab nationalists rebelled against their Turkish overlords and fought beside the British armies in the Middle East, confident that they would obtain unity and freedom. Moviegoers who have seen *Lawrence of Arabia* know the gloomy result: under League of Nation mandates, most of the Middle East was handed over to Britain and France, and frustrated Arabs wasted themselves in futile rebellions against the colonial powers. World War II did little better for the Arab nationalists. Individual states gained independence, but control was securely held by feudal monarchs or coalitions of landowners and businessmen who were often little more than colonial puppets. Sir Winston Churchill "invented" the state of Jordan "on a Sunday afternoon in Jerusalem." Even worse, in the Arab view, was the partition of Palestine to provide a national homeland for the Jews. Humiliation became complete in 1948, when the combined armies of the Arab countries were crushingly defeated by the Israelis.

**Moon Orbit.** Hence the enormous prestige Nasser won in 1956, when he survived the massed assault of Britain, France and Israel in the Suez War. Arabs ignored the fact that the Egyptians were beaten in the field and that only intervention by the U.S. and the Soviet Union saved Nasser from collapse. What mattered was that Nasser had engaged the imperialists and Israel in battle, and managed to survive. When Egypt later proved that it had the technical skill to operate the Suez Canal efficiently on its own, Arab nationalists were as proud as if Nasser had personally orbited the moon.

His Arab brethren also share pride in Nasser's achievements at home in the years since Suez. Cairo, a city as populous as Chicago, has become a bustling, busy metropolis. New skyscrapers line the banks of the Nile, throwing glittering light on the river at night and by day reflecting in their glass walls the stately grace of the sails of feluccas headed upriver with cargoes of wheat and lime.

The building boom is not confined to



the hotels, which were host this winter to a record half-million tourists. On the edge of the city, entire new suburbs are in being or abuilding. At Medinet el Waqf, Egypt's new managers are housed in modern stucco cottages. On the northern rim of the city, 40,000 low-cost housing units were erected last year.

But most of Cairo remains the same: close, crowded and cacophonous with hard-pressed auto horns. In Imbaba, on

the west bank of the Nile, camels streaked with henna still plod unknowingly toward the slaughterhouse, and gully-gully men delight bright-eyed, brown-faced children with magic tricks as they did their grandfathers 50 years ago. Imbaba's junk market is still unchanged, and bent nails and half-shoelaces are traded with solemnity and diligence. The red flowerpot of the tarboosh has all but vanished from Cairenes' heads, and Nasser has even made



CAIRO'S NEW NILE WATERFRONT  
Walking well-dressed, well-shod, with shoulders back.

considerable progress in his campaign to get his city folk to switch to European clothes from the nightshirt-like *galabiya*. Most astonishing is the fact that a visitor seldom sees a barefoot man, woman or child. Even urchins from the Cairo slums wear shoes—and socks. Today Cairo walks well-dressed, well-shod and bareheaded, with its shoulders back.

**Swallowed Revenues.** Of all Egyptians, the industrial worker has fared the best under Nasser. Next to him comes the fellah, the timeless peasant working the timeless land. It was the jest of 1952 that Nasser's foremost ambition was to raise the fellahin at least to the living standard of the *gamoosa*, the water buffalo of the Nile. He has more than succeeded. You can see it simply in the fellah's clothes. But also the fellah, who used to have meat only once or twice a year, now eats it at least once a week.

In pre-Nasser Egypt, the most common characteristic of the fellahin was summed up in the phrase *anna mali*, which roughly translates, "I couldn't care less." Today the word heard over and over is *nahdha*, a term meaning to sit up and take notice of the world around you. Egypt has been awake, taking notice and participating since the hot summer morning in July 1952, when Nasser and a group of young army officers put an end to the regime of King Farouk.

The resulting economic upsurge was hardly accomplished by Egypt alone. The intense development campaign swallowed up revenues from the Suez Canal, and from the biggest crop, cotton. In the process, the nation has spent its savings. Egypt's foreign-exchange reserves, which stood at a billion dollars after World War II, have dwindled to scarcely \$10 million. The consequence is an increasing dependence on foreign aid. The Communist bloc has committed itself to \$700 million in

economic aid since 1955, and Russia is footing the bill for the famed High Dam at Aswan, which by 1972 will increase the arable land of Egypt from 6,000,000 acres to 8,000,000 acres and supply 10 billion kw-h in electric power. Since 1945, the U.S. has supplied Egypt with \$628.6 million, mostly in the form of surplus food paid for in Egyptian pounds, 85% of which can be (and is) loaned back to Egypt. Today, Egypt is dependent on the U.S. for its food, and on Russia for its arms and the Aswan Dam.

The fact is that Nasser is not totally dependent on any one power or group of powers. He is still determinedly non-aligned. But things are better than the word implies. A few years ago, Nasser was nonaligned toward the East; today, he is more accurately regarded as non-aligned toward the West.

**Happy Nausea.** But Nasser's one-man rule has not brought unmitigated bliss to Egypt. The banks and insurance companies were nationalized, and their owners paid off partly in bonds that may not be redeemed for years to come. Contractors whose earnings reach \$69,000 a year are taken over, or forced to accept joint participation by the government. Wiped out are the great landowners; farm holdings are now limited to 100 acres per family. This form of socialism is benign enough. It leaves most of the nation's commerce in private hands and does not affect the overwhelming number of small farmers, who own far less than 100 acres.

The press was nationalized in 1960, and its editors are picked by the regime; they, of course, do not criticize Nasser's policies. Political activity in the usual sense is banned because, as Nasser puts it, "if I had three political parties, one would be run by the rich, one by the Soviets, and one by the U.S." The only party permitted by law is the official Arab

Socialist Union, which is supposed to provide democracy by its representation in every village, factory and urban district. There, leaders are chosen to pass local views along to provincial and national committees.

Nasser's revolution has never been particularly totalitarian, but there was a nasty period in late 1961, when Syria broke away from Egypt. Hundreds of people, including army officers, were arrested. Foreign diplomats were shadowed by secret police. But since then, the atmosphere of fear has largely vanished. General Mohammed Naguib, the 1952 revolution's first leader, who served for two years as a front for Nasser and was then deposed, still lives quietly in a Cairo villa near the Nile and is permitted to move fairly freely about the city. Old Nahas Pasha and other former Wafdist enemies of the new regime remain in their homes, which, in most cases, they have been allowed to keep.

Nasser's government has moved impressively into the fields of education and health. Primary schools were erected and staffed at a rate of two every three days. Education is free, and Egypt's universities are crammed with 126,000 students, including 20,000 from other Arab lands. Improved hygiene and free clinics have only increased the population pressure; the new arable land to be provided by the Aswan Dam will be barely enough to feed the estimated 55 million population in 20 years. In short, at tremendous cost, Egypt will not have gone forward but merely stood still. Faced with this challenge, Nasser has begun a nationwide birth control campaign. Oral contraceptives are being sold below cost (a month's supply for 46¢), and Egyptian women are said to relish the pills because they induce the same feeling of nausea experienced in pregnancy.

The pressure of Egypt's millions, in fact, is one of the things that makes other Arab states wary of being too closely embraced by Nasser. Egypt, like China, is always threatening to spill over its borders into the relatively empty land of its neighbors. Individualistic Arabs, as well, are nervously concerned about disappear-



AFLAK, NASSER  
Arranging new patterns . . .

ing into the straitjacket of Nasser's one-man rule.

**Laps of Generals.** To these dissenters, there is another flashing beacon of Arab unity: the Baath (Renaissance) Party, which dominates the new governments in both Iraq and Syria. The street mobs and impatient young army officers may worship Nasser, but Arab students and intellectuals bow before the creator of Baath, a tiny, beak-nosed, meek-chinned Syrian named Michel Aflak.

Aflak, 53, an Arab Christian who counts his amber worry beads three at a time, shuns crowds and holds no post in any government, makes an incongruous rival to the brash, burly, good-looking Nasser. No crowds have ever shrieked over him, chanted his name or paraded his picture. He lives in a small, cramped Damascus apartment with a frayed carpet, cheap furniture, and clothes drying on a balcony washline. His two infant children toddle about and, last week, clambered on the laps of generals and Cabinet ministers who crowded Aflak's parlor.

The son of a nationalist-minded shopkeeper, Aflak passionately embraced the ideal of Arab unity as a Damascus schoolboy. His education at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he graduated with honors in history, was financed by a successful uncle who had emigrated to Brazil. After a brief teaching career at a Damascus lycée, Aflak resigned in 1942 to devote his life to politics and to his personal creation, the Baath Party.

What Aflak created was a mystic and lyrical hymn to *Wahadi Arabiya* (Arab oneness), and he overflows with such sentiments as "Nationalism is love before everything else," and "A new page is open, the page of those who walk with naked souls as if they were in their own bedroom." He defines revolution as "that powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle, without which the reawakening of a nation cannot be understood." The Baath slogan, "Unity, Freedom, Socialism," was blandly appropriated by Nasser for his own use, but Nasser has shown no eagerness to take over other Baath tenets, such as free elections, free press, and freedom of speech and assembly.



EGYPTIAN & YEMENI TROOPS AT MARIB  
Rushing headlong into the 13th century.

From Syria, Baathism moved swiftly to Iraq and Jordan, more slowly to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Although the party is antibourgeois, most of its adherents come from middle-class intellectuals and small shopkeepers. Baath made conservative governments nervous with its socialism (which is actually a blend of mild Marxism and the New Deal), and was attacked by the Communists as a deviating exponent of weak liberalism. In Syria, during the course of 14 years and nine different coups, the Baath Party bobbed up and down. Not until 1958, when Syria's Communists were plotting an armed takeover, were the Baathists able to stampede Syrian conservatives into accepting unity with Egypt as the lesser evil.

**Slipped Border.** Unity was obtained, but at a high price. Once in control, Nasser insisted on the abolition of all parties, Baath included, and fixed on Syria the same tight controls and security-police system as in Egypt. Designated as the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic, Syria was flooded by officious Egyptian brass and cramped by Nasser's authoritarian economic schemes. Syrian officers who protested found themselves transferred to duty deep in Egypt; civilians quickly landed in jail. At last, even Michel Aflak rebelled and ordered the Baath Cabinet Ministers to resign in a body, setting the stage for Syria's angry secession from the U.A.R.

In Iraq the Baath Party faced crisis from the moment Dictator Karim Kassem established his bloody dictatorship in 1958. The Baathists participated in an armed revolt in the oil center of Mosul, which Kassem savagely suppressed with the help of Iraq's Communist militia. A Baathist group tried to kill Kassem, but failed and was butchered. Finally, last month, Baathist politicians and pro-Nasser military men organized and exe-

cuted the coup that resulted in the death of Kassem and the slaughter of hundreds of his Communist allies. Four weeks later, with far less blood, Baathists and pro-Nasser officers in Damascus brushed aside the conservative government of Syria. The way at last was open for the unity that everyone had been talking about.

**Complete Lesson.** The difficulty, of course, is that everyone wants unity on his own terms. Even Jordan's King Hussein, who is anathema to Nasser and the Baathists, says he hopes for eventual reconciliation with his enemies and admission of Jordan into the Arab Union. If necessary, Hussein told newsmen, he would abdicate to achieve Arab unity. But he quickly added, "Provided it's unity on a proper basis." Michel Aflak replies: "Jordan and Saudi Arabia are welcome to join the Arab Union, but not with their present regimes and rulers."

In Cairo President Nasser has given every indication that he intends to avoid the mistakes made during the hurried and ill-fated union with Syria. "The main reason for the lack of success," Nasser told *TIME* last week, "was that we accepted complete union and amalgamation, instead of federation and self-government in both states."

To begin discussion of a better system, Iraqi and Syrian delegations flew into Cairo fortnight ago for preliminary talks with Nasser. Last week an even more high-powered group of Syrians arrived, headed by Michel Aflak and Premier Salah El-Bitar, with the intention of laying down a solid foundation for the proposed unity structure. This week another set of delegates from Syria and Iraq will return to Cairo, each bringing a draft project for a new union.

**Noise in Aleppo.** It seems unlikely that any kind of federation with centralized authority will emerge. What is possi-



SYRIA'S EL-BITAR  
... of the kaleidoscope.

KHAMIS ABDEL LATIF

ble is a loose alliance, with harmonized defense and foreign policies. There might also be a degree of economic cooperation among the three nations, possibly including even Yemen, which is so backward that it has been described as "rushing into the 13th century." Such a system of sovereign states would represent a tacit admission that Arabs are not all alike and that their interests do not always coincide. The fact that the talks between Syrians, Iraqis and Egyptians have not yet produced anything concrete is less important than the fact that they are, at least, talking to one another and not screaming imprecations as they have done so often in the past.

But already some Arabs were becoming impatient. There were pro-Nasser demonstrations in the Syrian port of Aleppo. In Damascus a tough young Nasserite who had moved directly from a prison cell to an ornate government office dismissed the Baathists as ideologists, not political leaders. "We are going to run Syria with Nasser the way we want," he said. "We are going to unite with Egypt the way Nasser wants."

**Blasting Paths?** The fact that the Middle East is so consistently combustible and has so low an ignition point makes its affairs of deep importance to other powers. In the old city of Jerusalem last week, Arabs were jarred by recurrent dull explosions in the border areas, and there was speculation that Israeli demolition squads were blowing up old mines in no man's land to clear lanes for an advance into Jordan should King Hussein be overthrown by Nasserites.

Israel is not impressed by suggestions that Egypt's ruler has given up his domineering ways. One official in Tel Aviv warned: "Nasser finds it difficult to resist temptation. Success turns his head, and being basically a military man, he thinks in terms of external expansion." The Israeli government sees a hint of Nasser's dreams of grandeur in his Yemen adventure, which has already tied up one-third of his army. Israel's stated policy is that any change in the internal situation of her Arab neighbors affecting the security of her borders would free Israel of her undertaking to maintain the status quo. Many Arabs fear that Israel would move troops straight to the west bank of the Jordan River if Hussein's regime collapses.

**Fat or Thin.** Britain's present relations with Egypt are correct but cool. While recognizing Nasser's pre-eminence in the Arab world and his great abilities, the British remain wary of the man and his policies. Understandably, Britain is worried about the future of its few remaining Middle East colonies and its important oil interests. "Nasser's own stand on oil is ambiguous," complains one diplomat. "Of course, he would like to control oil-rich Kuwait, but so would everyone else."

British and U.S. oil executives, though admitting to some uneasiness about Nasser's intentions, see no immediate threat to the Middle East's daily flow of 6,500,000 bbl. "We have learned to live with political instability," says one oilman stoically. Their fear is not that the West will

lose access to the Middle East's proven oil reserves of 194 billion bbl., but that any new Arab grouping might start a campaign to reduce the producer's profits. "Arab unity may be good or bad for the oil industry," explained one official. "It depends on the goals of unity—and these are difficult to discern in the present situation."

**Drawn Line.** Sharply hostile after Nasser's Suez nationalization, and nervous at his flirtation with the Communists, U.S. policy more recently has turned in Nasser's favor. Recalling the days not so long ago when Cairo Radio was spouting ugly lies about the U.S., Washington is not inclined to be Nasser's sponsor. But the U.S. can cooperate with the man whose name is on every Arab lip. Officially, the U.S.



HARRY KOUNDAKJIAN  
DOOMED IRAQI COMMUNISTS  
Blood for blood.

aims at assisting any government, no matter what its form, that appears to be sincerely and effectively working for internal development and the good of its people. With indifference to social systems, the U.S. has aided Egypt on the left and Iran on the right, recognized the monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as pro-Nasser Yemen. But there is a line drawn by the U.S. "If the cold war in the Arab world threatens the large American interests in, say, Saudi Arabia, we'll have to take a stand," says a U.S. official.

Similarly, the U.S. considers itself non-aligned in the struggle between Israel and the Arab world. Washington's attitude toward Arab union is still tied to a pronouncement made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles said then, and it was repeated last week in Washington, that the U.S. looks with favor on any movement toward Arab union that is not imposed from outside the Arab world.

**Great Coups.** Nasser today takes an indulgent view of the U.S. His earlier resentments, he says, resulted from Amer-

ican attempts to force Egypt into joining such "imperialist" groupings as the Mediterranean Defense Organization and the Baghdad Pact. Nasser applauds the present Administration in Washington because "Kennedy tried from the first to understand us and to be realistic when facing the Arab world. Under John Foster Dulles, the U.S. withdrew its aid for the Aswan Dam, we faced blockade and even the blocking of our own money in U.S. banks." However, Nasser concedes, "it should not be forgotten that the U.S. stood by us in the United Nations during the Suez crisis, and that left a good impression."



President Nasser and President Kennedy have become close correspondents. "We are very frank with each other," says Nasser. "We don't exchange diplomatic words but express honest and frank opinions. I believe we have built up a confidence in each other." The confidence extends to U.S. Ambassador John Badeau, who speaks fluent Arabic and has unlimited access to Nasser, while his British counterpart sees Nasser only twice a year at formal meetings. The Communists are so convinced that the U.S. controls events in the Middle East that the Polish ambassador in Cairo stopped a U.S. diplomat at the entrance to a luncheon party and said bitterly: "I must congratulate you on your tremendous achievements in Iraq and Syria. You have made two great coups."

**Jiggled Leg.** At week's end in Cairo, the conferences on Arab unity droned on to the accompaniment of cigarette smoke and endless small cups of coffee. Nasser sat in on the negotiations, serenely confident that what finally emerged would be what he wanted. At 45, Nasser's hair has greyed at the temples, and he has given up tennis for the less demanding sport of swimming. He appears as physically fit as ever and retains his old nervous habits of jiggling his leg while sitting, and of smoking five packs of L. & M.s a day; like most Egyptians, he cannot stand the local brands. He still works twelve and 18 hours at a clip and is still the only man in the government who can be reached at any hour. A close aide says: "I've never heard of anyone getting chewed out for calling Nasser in the middle of the night. I do know of many who have been given unshirred hell for not calling him when something happened. He won't like you to say this, but it is still strictly a one-man show. He has lots of good technical help, but he trusts no one else with politics."

Even more than Russians, Arabs express their folk wisdom in proverbs, ranging from the cautionary (*see cover*) to the racially skeptical ("Better the tyranny of the Turks than the justice of the Arabs"). There are proverbs aplenty to fit the dream of unity. To the ambitious Nasser, other Arab leaders might point out the one that says, "The camel driver has his plans, and the camel has his." But proverbs are eclipsed by power, and last week nothing was more certain than that whatever unity scheme emerges in the Middle East, must, first of all, be satisfactory to Gamal Abdel Nasser. For of all the revolutions involved, only his in Egypt has survived and prospered for a full ten years.



# NASSER'S PRIDE AND GLORY



**T**OMORROW the Egyptian Revolution will be 10 years old. The closing weeks of its tenth year were marked by the adoption by the National Congress of Popular Forces of a National Charter which is expected to serve as the basis of national policy for at least another 10 years. As a comprehensive statement of political principles and as a guide to action it is unique in the Arab world. It is also a deliberate challenge to the Arab "reactionaries."

By the terms of the Charter Egypt is now officially a "co-operative socialist democracy." What of the reality?

If Socialism means nothing more than Government control, then Egypt is one of the most Socialist countries in the world. With the very important exception of land, the Government now runs all the basic enterprises of the country. It controls all banking and insurance, all foreign trade, the chief industrial, mining and constructional enterprises, all transport and communications, broadcasting, the Press and the plush hotels. It has also made substantial inroads into retail trade.

## Fringe benefits, but no political power

But what of the workers, who loom so large in Western Socialism? They have certainly gained since the revolution. There is a minimum wage which is rigidly applied, at least in Government-owned and Government-controlled enterprises. They enjoy more fringe benefits than ever before. They get a percentage of business profits, partly in cash, partly in benefits. But they have no political power. Although trade unions are regularly consulted by Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, their functions are purely advisory. It is the Government which decides. There is no right to strike in Egypt. The first of the few people who have been hanged by the revolution were ringleaders in a strike action.

Nobody in Egypt seriously pretends that the country is already a democracy in any Western sense of the word. Officials insist that the drive towards economic independence and ultimately welfare is more important than conventional freedoms. It is true that the National Congress was elected by popular vote. But candidates put up for election were screened by the Government. It was also

clearly understood by all concerned that the purpose of Congress was to suggest means of implementing the Charter, not to tear it up.

Yet Congress is no sham in the context of Egypt. There was no need for President Nasser to summon it nor to weary himself by taking part in its debates. It reflects an anxiety to identify the people more closely with the work of the Government and to coax them out of their traditional lethargy into public life—always with the understanding that it is the Government which makes the rules.

## Alien, acquisitive and often cruel

When the revolutionary officers seized power in 1952 they had no body of doctrine to guide them. Some had been in touch with the reactionary Muslim Brotherhood; others with liberals, Socialists and Communists. Some had wavered between two or more of these movements. Being mostly of middle or lower middle class origins themselves, they knew all about the protest of those classes against the monarchy and its foreign friends. Seeing also the futility of parliamentary government during 30 years of independence they sensed that they, the Army, could best give effect to that protest. The event proved that they sensed correctly.

The original aims of the revolutionary command were negative: to remove all foreign influences and to destroy a corrupt ruling class which by supplying defective arms had contributed to bring disgrace on the Army in Israel. Their positive aims emerged after much fumbling from a situation which they inherited.

The revolutionary command was the first wholly Egyptian Government to rule the country for over 2,000 years. Some of the preceding

dynasties had become at least partly Egyptianised. But the masses had held themselves aloof from government, regarding it as something alien, acquisitive and often cruel.

Furthermore, Egypt was a country in which the contrast between rich and poor was as glaring as anywhere in the world. Its economy was lopsided, heavily dependent on one export (cotton) for foreign exchange and importing all heavy and many light manufactures.

In this situation, with alien rule at home and economic dependence on foreign countries, the revolutionaries saw the political and economic servitudes in an organic embrace at the root of all their evils. The remedy was to reverse the position: to throw out foreign influence and to build a versatile economy, better able to stand on its own. This prompted the drive towards industrialisation which would have dominated Egyptian thinking but for the alarming growth of population which made expansion of agriculture equally necessary.

## Home resources were squeezed dry

The corollary as the revolutionaries saw it was that they must keep power in their own hands at least until the back of the economic problem was broken. The Muslim Brotherhood and Communists were crushed and all party activity was banned. No pretence was made of consulting the people.

The programme called for a heavy capital expenditure. Home resources were squeezed dry to yield savings for investment. Trade and currency movements were strictly controlled. Prices and wages were successfully kept at steady levels (Egypt is by far the

cheapest country in the Middle East). Capital in private hands was progressively taken over. It was a case of Socialism creeping rather fast, but for pragmatic rather than doctrinal reasons. The doctrine came later, largely under Yugoslav influences.

These measures were not enough to finance the bigger schemes which the Government had in mind. Foreign aid was needed. But Nasser, still obsessed by the thought of foreign domination, narrowed his field of search by insisting on aid "without strings," which actually means "without conditions explicitly attached." The turning-point came with the Soviet arms deal in 1955.

Looked at with the phlegm of seven years' habituation, the outcry aroused in the West by the arms deal looks somewhat absurd. But there were reasons for it at the time. By one stroke of business the Soviet Union had become a Middle Eastern Power leap-frogging the "Northern Tier" and biting deep into a supposedly Western preserve; and its emergence as arms supplier to Egypt upset the Anglo-American policy of balancing arms deliveries to Israel and the Arab States. The first result was exactly what Mr. Khrushchev wanted; the second was exactly what Nasser wanted.

## Rescued by international action

It was the Dulles era, when neutralism was immoral. The United States withdrew its offer to finance the High Dam at Aswan; Nasser replied by nationalising the Suez Canal; the British and French attacked Egypt together with the Israelis; Egypt was rescued by international action inspired in part by Mr. Dulles, who was even more shocked by the Anglo-French action than by the arms deal itself.

The excitement has now died down, except on the lunatic fringe. The permanent damage to Western interests in the Arab world is likely to be less serious than was feared largely because the West has recognised that Nasser and neutralism have to be lived with.

Yet in spite of Nasser's effective stand against Communism at home and gradual recovery of the West in Egypt, the Soviet Union remains the chief outside beneficiary of the squalls which beset the Egyptian revolution. The military equipment lost in Suez was replaced from Communist sources. Since 1958 the Russians have lent Egypt £186 million for industrial installation and for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.

If the successful struggle for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was the pride of the first 10 years of the revolution, completion of the High Dam will be the glory of the second decade. The two achievements (barring accidents) are likely

(Continued on Page 10)



# NASSER'S DECADE

(Continued from Page 8)

to go down to history together as Nasser's greatest claims to fame.

Work on the High Dam began in January, 1960. The venture aims to increase cultivated land in Egypt by 30 per cent and to reduce the cost of electric power, especially for industrialisation, to a fraction of its present level.

Most discussion about the High Dam project now centres on two questions: Whether or not progress is up to schedule and whether or not the Russians and Egyptians are working well together.

## Continuing to pour in equipment

Both questions are somewhat unreal. In an enterprise involving at least ten years' work around the clock, schedules must be approximate only and elastic. As work goes on plans may be modified because of unforeseen difficulties, second thoughts or bright ideas. Engineers on the spot seem to have little doubt that the entire work, including a 12-unit power station, will be in position some time in 1970, give or take a few months.

The same with Russo-Egyptian relations. It would be absurd to suppose that an enterprise involving at least 10,000 men and two

nationalities could be conducted with no friction at all. But the Russians are continuing to pour in equipment which the Egyptians, with Russian advice where needed, are bringing into action as fast as they can. Any disharmony that exists is clearly insignificant.

Successful gambles like nationalisation of the Suez Canal, great enterprises like the High Dam, appeal to the conspicuously human Egyptians. There is a touch of awe creeping into the popularity which surrounds Nasser. It is perhaps strongest with scientists, engineers and chemists, to whom he has promised technological paradise. But it is also strong with the Army and Civil Service, with the liberal professions, with universities and schools. "Who else would have dared all these things and got away with them?" It is now as difficult to conceive an Egypt without Nasser as a Yugoslavia without Tito or an India without Nehru—and Nasser is still a young man.

That, of course, is not the whole picture. Many have suffered grievously by nationalisation and sequestration. Whenever Nasser is said to be preparing a major speech a tremor runs through minority elements such as the Greeks and Armenians. (Of the 840 people whose property was sequestered after the secession of Syria a high proportion were of foreign extraction.) At the other end of the line there are the more desperately ignorant peasantry, many of whom have never yet heard of Nasser. Even in the Delta it is possible to find peasants in reasonable number who do not know that the monarchy has fallen.

Another source of pride for Nasser's supporters is the place

Egypt now occupies in international affairs. In spite of his failure to supplant "reactionary" Arab regimes, to keep control of Syria, to give effective support to African friends like Lumumba and Gizenga, to prevent Israeli penetration of Africa: in spite of all this Cairo is one of the great capitals of the uncommitted world, perhaps the greatest after aloof New Delhi. It is the headquarters of several international organisations such as the Arab League and Afro-Asian Solidarity Council. Scarcely a week goes by without an international conference somewhere in the city. It is the home of countless exiles from the Arab world and Africa.

## Aid from any quarter


Apart from the size and reputation of Cairo itself, the reason for this polyglot concentration is that Nasser faces problems which have their counterparts throughout the underdeveloped world (in Cairo one speaks of the "developing" or "progressive" world).

The spectacular fashion in which he is tackling them, destroying the rich, imposing austerity, accepting aid from any quarter and going his own way, even over the brink into war, has caught the uncommitted eye. Oddly enough it is his success in the internal field which has given him his international reputation; his foreign adventures have usually dimmed it.

## Jewish theology

Rabbi Dr. Louis Jacobs is to head a new Society for the Study of Jewish Theology. Inquiries should be sent to the honorary secretaries at the society's temporary address, 22, Queen Anne Street, London, W.1.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY



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
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
# PLANES

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# The Future of Egypt

By JOHN MARLOWE

**T**HE other day I was reading an account of the Putney debates at which the politically minded officers of Cromwell's New Model Army argued about national policy during the last days of the Long Parliament. These 'russet-coated captains'—men like Pride and Ireton and Whalley—in their naivety and sincerity, in their alternating moods of humility and bombast, of toleration and intolerance, of confidence and something near panic, reminded me powerfully of the young army officers who are ruling Egypt today.

In some ways these young Egyptian officers are faced with the same problems as faced the Puritan leaders after the execution of Charles I. They have temporarily triumphed over their active enemies, and they are now faced with the more insidious opposition of cynicism and derision among the educated classes, and apathy and disillusion among the ignorant classes. This combination destroyed the Puritan Revolution in England. How is the Egyptian Revolution going to fare?

The Egyptian army leaders are at a great disadvantage compared with Cromwell's Ironsides in that they have neither the leadership of a Cromwell nor the prestige of past military victories. Mohamed Neguib, the original titular leader of the revolution, was never much more than a figurehead, although, as a figurehead, he developed political ambitions which led to his political eclipse. Now, as President, he sits in gilded impotence in the old royal palace at Abdine with his telephone tapped and his correspondence censored. Such popular enthusiasm as there was for the revolution at the outset was evoked by the personality of Mohamed Neguib, which really did 'catch on' with the Egyptian people. But Neguib was a Kerensky rather than a Cromwell and, if he had had his way—which at one point he probably could have done if he had had sufficient determination and ruthlessness—he would have led Egypt away from revolutionary courses back to parliamentary democracy.

When the struggle for power took place last winter between Neguib and Abdul Nasser, Neguib was supported by the cavalry officers, led by Kamel Mohieddin, a member of the Revolutionary Council, and Nasser was supported by the infantry, artillery, and Air Force. This split in the armed forces was due in part to the superior social status of the cavalry officers who were becoming alarmed at the social doctrines of Abdul Nasser and his supporters. For good or ill, Abdul Nasser won that trial of strength, the cavalry officers have been well, though bloodlessly, purged, and Kamel Mohieddin has been sent into an exile disguised as an official purchasing mission. (One may note, in parenthesis, and, I think, respect and admire, the extraordinary lack of ruthlessness displayed by the revolutionary leaders towards their opponents. The executions can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The King was allowed to go into exile. Many of those sentenced to long terms of imprisonment by the Revolutionary Tribunal are now sitting quietly in their homes. There has certainly been a good deal of shabby and petty spitefulness, but of bloodshed and horror very little.)

As a result of the elimination of

Neguib, the Egyptian Revolution has gained in political coherence and purpose, but has lost considerably in popularity and prestige. Two years ago, whenever Neguib appeared in public, the cheers which greeted him really did sound spontaneous and enthusiastic. When Abdul Nasser or any of the army leaders appear in public now, well-drilled clagues



General Neguib being enthusiastically received during a tour of Lower Egypt in 1952

shout rhythmic slogans just as they used to do in the days of Farouk and Nahas. And the army, which still provides the whole impetus for the revolutionary movement, has little prestige to compensate for the lack of personal magnetism in the leaders. The historical background of the abortive Arabi revolt, which

is continually being quoted by the army leaders, is not really an inspiring one. Professionally, there is nothing in the martial past of the Egyptian army to inspire either affection or respect. Socially, the Egyptian army officers previously enjoyed little of the prestige accorded to army officers in some other countries; while this may explain in part the emergence of army officers as a revolutionary body, it also helps to explain the supercilious attitude which educated Egyptians tend to adopt towards the present regime.

In one respect, however, the Egyptian revolutionaries have an easier task than the Puritan leaders to whom I have likened them. The Egyptians, excitable on the surface, are, by and large, an extremely docile people, which could not have been said of the English people in the seventeenth century. The problem before Abdul Nasser and his colleagues is not how to maintain themselves in power, which they can do easily enough with a relatively well-paid and efficient army and a relatively well-organised security service, but how to make some constructive use of the power which they have so easily and so bloodlessly obtained.



Primitive method of raising water in a land where irrigation is a major problem.

J. Allan Cash

Those of us who know and who love Egypt, whether or not we particularly like the methods of Abdul Nasser and his associates, would like to see the development of something better than another twopenny-halfpenny military dictatorship, eked out by foreign aid, in which ever-increasing poverty and misery fester sullenly behind a thin façade of military parades and tourist attractions. But if this is to be avoided it will not be sufficient to achieve diplomatic triumphs, to maintain internal security, and to receive a steady trickle of arms and technical assistance from abroad.

Egypt today has a population of some 22,000,000, increasing at a rate of about 250,000 a year. She has little industry and her cultivable area is limited, ultimately by the amount of Nile water flowing through Egypt, and immediately by the extent to which that water is used for irrigation. The present irrigated area is insufficient to support the present agricultural population, even on the pathetically low standards of life obtaining (the average income of an Egyptian peasant family is estimated at the equivalent of about £30 a year), and every year more and more people are being crowded off the land into the slums of the cities. In order even to maintain present living standards, productive work has to be found for the annual population increase both by a progressive increase in the cultivable, that is to say the irrigated, area, and by industrial development.

### A Vicious Spiral

It is estimated that in 1950 ten per cent. less food was consumed per head of the Egyptian population than in 1930. This means that in the most vital matter of all Egypt is not even standing still; she is going backwards. And I do not think that the present regime would claim that this trend has yet been reversed. You have got poverty perpetuating ignorance and ignorance perpetuating poverty. This vicious spiral must be broken. The basic need is for capital investment—for new irrigation works, for agricultural settlement on lands brought into cultivation by new irrigation works, for the establishment of new industries, and for the development of existing industries. The subsidiary need is to inject into the Egyptian people, and particularly into the educated minority of the Egyptian people, something of the urgency and energy which is demanded by the problems facing Egypt, and which is actually possessed by the handful of young officers who are now ruling Egypt.

To take the problem of capital investment first. Unless an under-capitalised country adopts the ruthless and forcible methods of capital investment characteristic of communism, or unless it is fortunate enough to have large liquid capital resources at its disposal, it must, if it is to become a field for large-scale investment, offer better terms to free enterprise than is necessary in heavily capitalised countries. This is particularly the case in Egypt since, short of wholesale expropriation, it would be impossible to mobilise from domestic sources anything like the capital investment, let alone the technical resources, required.

It is here that the legitimate Egyptian desire for detailed and comprehensive government control is at war with the urgent necessity for increased capital investment. Capital investment in Egypt is too tender a plant to be subjected to the methods of control which are familiar in Great Britain and the United States. This would be so even if regulations and controls were intelligently and consistently applied. That they are not often so applied is not surprising when one considers the difficulties inherent in trying to run a managed economy with a demoralised and underpaid civil service which is only just emerging from a long and unsavoury tradition of corruption and nepotism.

Compared with the position obtaining in many Asiatic and South American countries, the position of the foreign capitalist is neither unfavourable in itself, nor unduly discriminatory *vis-à-vis* Egyptian nationals. Company taxation is low; regulations about the repatriation of profits reasonable; restrictions on the employment of foreigners not unduly severe. The most onerous and frustrating aspect of these regulations and restrictions, as well as of those, such as import restrictions and labour laws, which affect Egyptians and foreigners alike, is the amount of time and energy involved in groping a way through a labyrinth of formalities.

In some ways the foreigner is better placed than his Egyptian colleague or competitor, who finds it difficult to leave Egypt on business, and who may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, fine, imprisonment, or petty persecution. In practice the worst that can happen to a foreigner who behaves himself as regards the ordinary criminal law is to be thrown out of the country, and this happens comparatively rarely. What the foreigner is up against in Egypt is neither xenophobia nor excessive economic nationalism, but a sort of generalised official suspicion

which extends both to Egyptians and to foreigners and which is reciprocated by the suspicion harboured against the Government by most of the inhabitants of Egypt. Mutual suspicion between governor and governed is traditional in most oriental countries; and a military dictatorship is not a form of government obviously designed either to stop suspecting people or to persuade people to stop suspecting them. It is a legacy both of past indigenous oppression and foreign domination and of present feelings of insecurity and inadequacy. It is, I think, a malaise which has far-reaching effects both on the economic and on the psychological aspects of Egypt's problems. It helps to explain why the Egyptian revolution has not 'taken' in the sense of creating anything like a popular movement which 'knows what it is fighting for and loves what it knows'.

Almost every educated Egyptian knows what Egypt needs—in two words, increased productivity—and, either from the capitalist or from the communist point of view, has an intellectual appreciation of the methods necessary to attain it. What is lacking is any real will or determination to do anything about it. That is why I say that the revolution has not 'taken'.

The need for positive and informed understanding and support for the professed and, as I believe, sincere aims of the present Egyptian Government is becoming more apparent now that there are signs of positive opposition emerging. This opposition is centred on the Moslem Brotherhood, which seems to be becoming a Cave of Adullam for everyone, communists, ex-pashas and fire-eating students, as well as fanatical Moslems who, for various reasons, are discontented with the present regime. The one thing in common between these various elements is opposition to the Government: the communists presumably because of the party line, the ex-pashas because they want to go back to the good old days, the students because they find agitation more exciting than working for examinations, and the fanatical Moslems because they want no truck with the west. Islam may provide a convenient rallying cry for all this varied discontent but I cannot see Islam in Egypt today being used as an effective political weapon by anyone. Islam has little hold on educated people in Egypt, and among uneducated people is far more a source of comfort than a source of power.

The importance of Islam as a political factor seems to have been consistently overrated in British official circles. One recalls the illusory importance attached in 1914 to the possibility that the Sultan of Turkey, as Khalif-al-Islam, might unite the Moslems of the world, including the Moslems of India, in a holy war against the Allies. One remembers the influence exerted on our Palestine policy by the fear of repercussions among the Moslems of India. Even today there is a tendency to exaggerate the counter-revolutionary potential of Islam, in Egypt and elsewhere, whether from the point of view of combating communism or of opposing westernisation. In my view the most that Islam can do today in the political field is to buttress an appeal to reactionary prejudices. The real strength of the opposition is not religious fanaticism, still less is it the appeal of communism or the attraction of a return to the *status quo* ante the revolution. Its real strength lies in the fact that for obvious historical reasons the Egyptian mind finds it much easier to generate enthusiasm for opposing things than for helping to create them.

### Target for Criticism

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement looks like causing a dangerous lacuna in the Egyptian consciousness. The Egyptian Government will inevitably become the target for much of the criticism which previously was diverted against British imperialism. The temptation to build up another foreign enemy for domestic purposes is likely to be a strong one. The temptation to seek foreign quarrels for the purpose of allaying domestic discontents was not entirely resisted by the Puritan rulers of England. We shall understand the present regime in Egypt better if we think of it in terms of seventeenth-century England rather than of twentieth-century Europe. Much of the British criticism directed at Abdul Nasser and his colleagues stems from the scant respect which they showed for the sovereignty of the Egyptian parliament. Whatever anyone may think of the English Puritans, there will be few to condemn them today because of their disrespect for the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. But this doctrine was just as respectable in the seventeenth century as the doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament is today. In so far as Abdul Nasser and his colleagues have offended western susceptibilities, they have done so out of lack of respect, not for the eternal verities, but for twentieth-century democratic conventions.

—Third Programme

Russia To-day

The Only Man In Step

By EDWARD CRANKSHAW

ONE of the most baseless illusions about the Soviet Union is that there is never any confusion about the Party line—at least among responsible officials. On the contrary, there is much.

Confusion of this sort existed even under Stalin, when ideas were simple, rough and few. Under Mr. Khrushchev, who has a new idea every week, the efforts of the Party's theoreticians to weld the Master's bits and pieces into a strong, clear-headed, ideological structure with seamless joints provide a source of modest entertainment for anyone with the least slings of malice in his make-up whose duty it is to watch such things from a distance.

Keeping up with the boss has become a lonely scramble for an hourly undertaking only by those who combine extreme agility with stamina; a direct sense of humor must also be a help. Not many succeed.

Received Truth

But there are still some souls who attach to Party assignments the sort of sincerity they had under Stalin. Ever since the Polish and Hungarian troubles just three years ago, the safe word has been "received truth." Revisionism, on the face of it, is the act of distorting the received truth. Received from whom? From Lenin, of course—naturally. Nothing should be easier; you just base your position on what Lenin said and did.

But Lenin said and did so many different things at so many different times. Clearly we need a guide. Well, can this be? Obviously it can be found, other than the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Khrushchev himself. But not even Mr. Khrushchev can find time to provide a foolproof gloss for everything that Lenin said. He has things to say himself. And the two large fields open in which the revisionist may stray and lose themselves.

Not Innocent

Thus, earlier this year, three appeared a pamphlet entitled under the official seal of the Ministry of Higher Education of the U.S.S.R. This production was an attack on "revisionist distortions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the State and the Law," and it was signed by Professor K. A. Molochov, head of the All-Union Extramural Legal Institute of the Ministry of Higher Education of the U.S.S.R.

Most foreigners reading this pamphlet take a great many Russians, particularly those reading it, to assume that it contained the official thinking of the Soviet Government. And, reading on, they would be surprised, because one of the three, Professor Molochov is attacking in what he calls the revisionist attitude

of those Soviet lawyers who insist, among other things, on the presumption of innocence in the accused until his guilt is proved.

He goes on to argue about this and concrete matters in the spirit of the late Mr. Vyshinsky. The idea that the accused's innocence must be presumed, he says, is a bourgeois idea; therefore it must be revisionist. The very fact that a man is brought to trial means that he must be guilty, because "without the guilt of the particular individual in respect of the particular crime there can be no investigation, interrogation, or trial" (my exclamation mark).

Big Guns

The pronunciation does not accord at all with the way in which we had imagined, the Russians have been moving for some time. But there it is, in black and white.

Did it mean that we were back on the Dark Side of the Moon?

Not a bit of it. Professor Molochov's little pamphlet could not have been more wrong. In a recent issue of Kommunist, the Party's fortnightly paper, the big guns have been unmasked and trained on the Professor. He is blown out of the water for "over-simplifying and vulgarizing the light against revisionism."

First of all he attacks Lenin, on the very meaning of revisionism. Then he has unmasked as revisionist ideas which are not revisionist at all. He says, for example, that people who talk about the withering away of the State before the Communist society is built are revisionist. Kommunist points out that while Mr. Khrushchev himself has asserted that the withering process is slow, at this very moment, in action.

"This process is actually going on. As the Soviet State develops, the functions of Government change and certain organs of administration also undergo change." Or, as the 21st Party Congress this year: "The question of the withering away of the State, it is understood dialectically, is a question of the development of the Socialist State government into Communist communal self-government."

It is impossible not to sympathize a little with Professor Molochov, who simply has not managed to keep up. The first remark was made in one

of the bourgeois thought of first? Did not Lenin himself write on: "Adopt without question everything in the literature and practice of the western European nations, which may help to protect the workers?" Etcetera. One point of all this is that so far, in spite of a great deal of talk and preparatory drafting, many things are still unclear about the new Soviet legal code. Every Kommunist cannot use any statutory authority for his view.

A Warning

Kommunist bases its insistence on the necessity for the presumption of innocence in the accused on, among other things, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emanated from the United Nations Assembly in 1948 (when the Soviet Labour camps were ticked at once before with the victims of arbitrary arrest, on a letter to President Truman, in 1954, a number of Soviet scientists protesting against a Greek court sentence, and the expulsion of a Soviet representative at an international conference of jurists in Vienna in 1954, and on the Supreme Soviet's decision to give the Soviet Republic of Court Prosecutor, which says in Article 7, that the court alone has the right to determine the guilt of a man, and in part, until his guilt has been proved. And, by his assuming he is a reasonable lawyer, that talk about the sins of the revisionists is best left for the time being to the Prime Minister and First Secretary, the most skilled revisionist of them all.



of Mr. Khrushchev's countless interviews with foreign journalists. The second, with all respect, is obscure.

The Professor has made other mistakes, which Kommunist details. But the real sin is his categorical statement that under Soviet law there is no question of condemning the accused in respect of his guilt is proved. What has the bourgeois got to do with it? Kommunist declares: "Certainly the bourgeois thought of it first. So what? Are we to reject everything everywhere that

Talking to President Nasser

The Future for Egypt

By WALTER LIPPMANN



President Nasser

BY chance, and not because of President Eisenhower's plans, my wife and I have just spent a month in the general area, which the President is now visiting. We went out by way of Rome to Cairo, from there to Bombay and New Delhi, and then on to Teheran, returning home by way of London.

I choose Egypt because it is the most powerful of the Arab States, and because it is the moral and intellectual centre of the Arab community. The question to which I try to find the answer was where in the Nasser regime is the centre of its interest. Is it the conflict with Israel? Is it the leadership of the Arab movement and the realization of the idea of Pan-Arab unity extending from Morocco to the Persian Gulf? Or is it the internal development of Egypt?

Real Aim

We were in Egypt for about ten days, and I called at some length with President Nasser, with the leading members of his Government who deal with foreign policy and with those in charge of the internal economy. I met also with Egyptian newspapermen and with some of the foreign diplomats. My wife and I visited the Sinai Canal and to the site of the High Dam which the Russians are going to build at Assuan. At the end I felt reasonably certain that the centre of political gravity in the internal conflict of Egypt, Everything else, Israel, the Arab States, the Soviet Union, though related, is subordinate to what President Nasser can do and what he cannot do to achieve his goal without officially, but definitely, the standard of life of the Egyptian people in the course of ten years.

If this is true, it is of great practical importance in the shaping of Western policy towards Egypt and the Middle East. For it means the difference between one way of treating Nasser as a man and hoping to keep him weak and on the other hand a policy which binds him in the interests of peace and stability.

Israel Question

I shall now say what led me to this conclusion. And I shall begin with the relations between Egypt and Israel. This is the topic which everyone is talking about. But I always kept the subject for the end of our interviews, having learned early in the day that, with some exceptions, I found a subject which I was sure would be treated in a more realistic and not stereotyped rhetoric, must be approached indirectly by way of other subjects and interests.

As between Egypt and Israel the true situation is, as in so many other points of conflict in the world, one where there can be neither winner nor loser. There cannot be peace because no Arab statesman, beginning with President Nasser, would be willing to make a settlement which recognizes the existence of Israel. Almost certainly, if he tried to do that he would be assassinated.

Why? Not because the Egyptian nation as such has any mortal conflict of interest with Israel, but because the conditions created in Palestine by the creation of Israel has killed the Arab world with desperate and fatalistic men. They have great influence with public opinion. In fact they dominate it. It is an impossible for an Arab to be pro-Israel as for a Catholic Cardinal to be a Communist. In Egypt and among Arab States near Israel a reputation of hostility to Israel is for politicians a necessity. They may think what they like. But in public they must be irreconcilable.

Serious Fear

At the same time, however, it is well understood in Egypt that the recent report of Israeli-Palestine is quite impossible. What they do not seem to be thought of accepting and recognizing Israel, in any private and serious discussion it is acknowledged that it would be foolish to try with the idea of reconquest by force of arms. The two unhappy ways with Israel have not been forgotten and the

military power of Israel is certainly not to be underestimated.

Indeed, I came away convinced that there is a serious fear of military aggression by Israel. I inquired about this determination in the Egyptian press. They know from the Sinai campaign of 1956 that the Israeli Army is greatly superior to the Egyptian Army. The Arab States combined. In short, Israel is able to commit aggression and extend its territory. The Egyptians do not feel that there exists an fact a balance of power in their region of the Middle East. Remembering the British and French actions in 1956, and still being deeply suspicious of the intentions of the United States, the Egyptians do not rule out the possibility that the West might unleash Israel and egg it on.

Immigration

Combined with this, they wish the immigration into Israel, and they tell themselves that as the population continues to grow, the State of Israel is bound to expand its territory, and they cannot imagine how the present territory of Israel can support all the loadings of Ben-Gurion in coming.

This is significant because they believe it is well, therefore, seek some way to limit immigration, and they are not alone in this. It is significant also because one of what it reflects about their own ways of thinking. The present situation in Egypt is that there is a revolutionary coup by young officers of the Army. When they take to control the State of Israel is bound to control agreement in order to expand its territory, they regard this as the natural thing for any country to do in order to expand its territory. They are quite in this population. The fact is that they would think of doing if they found their own internal conditions in Egypt in the present, they are looking for opportunities and possibilities for themselves in the oil-producing States of the Persian Gulf and in Libya.

Two Views

I asked why Israel could not support its own population by industrialization. The answer was that Israel is not a natural source of wealth, that it is a subsidized State, and that its being run the support from outside will taper off, and the experiment will fail.

Referring on this analysis, they continued, as I have said, the Israel must control its own population. But they do not close also, when they are in the mood to believe, that the great Powers will not allow such a situation. They believe that Israel will lose its independence in that part of the world, and will become a puppet State of the great Powers. It is often said that the crucial question is the solution, or at least an alleviation, of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Undoubtedly this is true. This is where something must and where something can be done to reduce the tension.

But for what it is worth, my view is that what can be done for the refugees will depend in the main not only on the means and the money which the world is willing to invest, but also, primarily, on the internal condition of the Arab States, and particularly of Egypt. The refugee problem depends in the last analysis on the willingness of Egypt and the other Arab States to let it be solved. The willingness to do this will be greatly affected by the progress President Nasser makes in the development of the Egyptian economy.

This brings me back to the opening theme of this report—that the

(Continued on Page 18)

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The Egyptian Struggle—3

# Geography and Destiny

By Lieut.-Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser

## Sayings of the Week

The word "never" is one which, in politics, can only be used in its general relativity to the subject. — Sir Winston Churchill.

It is always possible to co-exist with a tiger who has just had a large meal and is digesting it. — Senator Knowland.  
We have never been turncoats. — Marshal Tito.

I agree that it would be highly improper for a teacher trainee to swim without any costume at all. — The Master of the Rolls.

We can rightly pray for a change in the weather, but we must not resent it if His answer is different from what we hoped. — The Archbishop of York.

The cathode ray tube is no more essential to the good life than modern plumbing. — The B.B.C. Handbook.

The Ronson gives you a real MAN'S shave. — Advertisement.

While it might be true that many men owed their success to their wives, it might also be said that many owed their wives to their success. — Speaker at Blackpool Savings Conference.

How on earth a classless society can afford four classes of railway travel and three classes of waiting rooms would even defy Karl Marx, never mind a simple Methodist like myself. — Mr. Sam Watson, on Soviet railways.

IN visualising Egypt's present situation we have to take account not only of her history, as I outlined in my last article, but also of her geographical position.

If we cannot now deny the facts of history and return to the tenth century and wear its clothes that now seem strange and ludicrous and be misled by its ideas which appear to-day to be those of a dark and ignorant age, we equally cannot behave as if we were a piece of Alaska in the most distant regions of the north, or a Wake Island remote and alone in the wilderness of the Pacific. For the time of isolation is past.

If we look at Egypt's position on the map and the role which she is called on to play by the logic of that position, three things are obvious.

First, can we fail to see that there is an Arab zone surrounding us? That this zone is part of us and we part of it, our histories being inextricably interwoven and our interests closely linked?

Secondly, can we possibly ignore the fact that there is an African continent which we have been made part of by fate, and that the terrible contention now going on about its future will have its influence on us whether we will or no?

Thirdly, can we ignore the fact that there is an Islamic world with which we are united by bonds of religious principle reinforced by historical realities?

### Role in Search of a Hero

The vicissitudes of history are full of heroes who create for themselves roles of great glory and heroism, playing them at decisive moments on the stage of history. And certainly the vicissitudes of history are also full of heroic and glorious roles which never find heroes to perform them. For some reason, it always strikes me that in this area in which we live there is a role running around aimlessly looking for a hero to give it being. For some reason, it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings in the vast spaces around us, has collapsed on the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to stir ourselves, to go to it, take it up, put on its costume, and give it life. And indeed, we are the only ones who can do so.

Here, let me hasten to say that the role is not one of leadership or domination. It is rather a role of interaction with and response to all the factors mentioned above, which involves making use of the tremendous latent strength in the region surrounding us to create a great power in this area which will

then rise up to a level of dignity and undertake a positive part in building the future of mankind.

There can be no doubt that the Arab zone is the most important and the one with which we are most closely linked by history, geography and religion.

This zone is intermixed with us also by virtue of religion.

So far as I can recall, the first glimmers of Arab awareness began to steal into my consciousness when I was a student in a secondary school. I used to go out on a general strike with my comrades every year on the second of December because of the Balfour Declaration which Britain made on behalf of the Jews, giving them thereby the populated land of Palestine, tyrannously wresting it from its rightful owners.

### Bitterness and Disappointment

And at that time, when I asked myself why I went out on strike with such zeal and why I was angry about a country I'd never even seen, I could find no answer except the ties of sentiment.

Then a kind of understanding began to develop when I became a student in the Military Academy, where I studied in particular the history of military campaigns in Palestine, and in general the history of the area and its surroundings, which have made of it during the past hundred years an easy prey for the allied fangs of hungry beasts! Things grew still more clear, and the underlying realities became apparent when, in the General Staff College, I began to study the Palestine offensive\* and the problems of the Mediterranean Sea in detail.

The result was that when the Palestine crisis began, I was utterly convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not taking place on foreign soil, nor was our participation going beyond the requirements of simple friendship. It was a duty made obligatory by the necessity of self-defence.

All the Arab peoples entered Palestine in a single wave of enthusiasm. They did so on the basis of common feelings and a common estimation shared by all as to the borders of their security. All the Arab peoples emerged from Palestine with the same bitterness and disappointment, and then each in its own internal affairs encountered the same factors, the same ruling forces that had brought about their defeat

\* Probably refers to Allenby's campaign in 1916-18, or possibly that of Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad Ali's brilliant son, in 1832.

### The Prime Minister and military leader of Egypt continues his own story of the Revolution and the ideas behind it



Picture Post Library  
Col. Abdul Nasser

and forced them to bow their heads in humbleness and shame.

When the struggle was over in Palestine and I had returned to Egypt, the Arab zone, in my eyes, had become a single whole. The events that have taken place since have confirmed my belief. It is a single region, with the same circumstances affecting each part of it, the same factors, the same forces united in opposition. And it was clear that the foremost of these forces was Imperialism. Even Israel itself is nothing but one of the results of Imperialism. For if Palestine had not fallen under the British Mandate, Zionism would never have been able to get the support necessary for realisation of the idea of a national State in Palestine. The idea would have remained a mad impossible dream.

### The Sources of Our Strength

When all these truths had impressed themselves on me, I began to believe in the need for a common struggle. Finally, I began to make political contacts for the sake of unifying the struggle by whatever means.

I do not want to minimise the obstacles between us and unity in the common struggle. But I do not doubt for a moment that our common struggle will achieve for us and our peoples everything that we desire and long for. For I shall always maintain we are strong. The only trouble is, we do not realise just how strong we are.

We make the wrong definition of strength. It is not strength to shout at the top of our lungs; real strength is to act positively with all the means at our command. When I try to analyse the elements of our strength there are three main sources which must go down first in the ledger.

The first of these sources is that we are a community of neighbouring peoples linked by all the material and moral ties possible, and that our peoples have characteristics and abilities and a civilisation which have given rise to three high holy religions—which absolutely cannot be neglected in the effort to build a secure and peaceful world. This is the first source.

### Half the World's Reserves of Oil

As for the second source of strength, it is our land itself and its important strategic position.

There remains the third source: oil, a sinecure of material civilisation without which all its machines would cease to function.

I would like to pause for a moment on oil. Perhaps its existence as a material reality demon-

strable by facts and figures will provide a useful model for our analysis of the importance of the sources of strength in our country.

I read recently an article published by the University of Chicago on the oil situation. It would be a good thing if every Arab could read it, grasp its implications, and see the great meaning concealed behind the statistics and figures.

The article points out, for example, that the effort to extract oil in the Arab countries requires comparatively little capital, that the cost of producing a barrel of oil in America is 78 cents, in South America 43 cents, but in the Arab countries, only 10 cents.

The article further says that the centre of world oil production has shifted—from the United States, where wells are going dry, the cost of land is going up, and the wages of construction workers have risen—to the Arab area, where the wells are still virgin, where land over vast spaces continues to cost nothing, and where the worker continues to receive less than a subsistence wage. Half the proven reserves of oil in the world lie beneath Arab soil, the remainder being divided between the United States, Russia, the Caribbean, and other parts of the world.

### Africa: We Cannot Remain Aloof

So we are strong. Strong not in the loudness of our voices when we cry for help but rather when we remain silent and measure the extent of our ability to act in a situation, when we really understand the strength resulting from the tie binding us together and making our land a single region of which no part, like an isolated island, can be protected without protection of the whole.

If next we turn to the second zone, the continent of Africa, I may say without exaggeration that we cannot under any circumstances, however much we might wish, remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary struggle going on in Africa to-day between five million Whites and 200 million Africans. We cannot do so for an important and obvious reason: we are in Africa. The peoples of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard the northern gate and who constitute their link with all the outside world. We will never in any circumstances be able to vacate our responsibility to support with all our ability the spread of enlightenment and civilisation to the remotest depths of the jungle.

There remains an important reason, which is that the Nile is the artery of life for our country, bringing water from the heart of the continent. As a final reason, the boundaries of our beloved brother, the Sudan, extend far into the core of Africa, bringing into contiguity the sensitive regions in that area.

### Possibilities in Muslim Co-operation

I shall continue to dream of the day when I shall find in Cairo a great African institute dedicated to opening up the regions of the continent to view, to creating in our minds an enlightened African consciousness, and to sharing with others from all over the world in the work of advancing the peoples of the continent and their welfare.

There remains a third zone—a zone which stretches across continents and oceans and which is the domain of our brothers in faith who all, wherever under the sun they may be, turn as we do in the direction of Mecca and whose devout lips speak the same prayers.

When I went with the Egyptian delegation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to offer condolences on the death of its sovereign, my belief in the possibility of extending the effectiveness of the Pilgrimage, building upon the strength of the Islamic tie linking

all Muslims, grew very strong. I stood in front of the Ka'ba [the chief Muslim shrine at Mecca] and was aware of the circling round of all the regions of the earth reached by Islam. Then I found myself saying our view of the Pilgrimage must change. It should not only be regarded as a ticket of admission into Paradise after a long life, or as a mere seeking for forgiveness after a merry one. It should become an institution of great political power and significance. The Press of the world should hasten to cover the Pilgrimage, not because it is a traditional ritual affording entertaining pictures for the reading public, but because of its function as a periodic political conference in which the leaders of the Islamic States, their leaders of thought, their learned men in every branch of industry and knowledge, their writers, captains of industry, merchants, and their youth can meet in order to lay down in this Islamic world parliament the broad lines of their national policies and their mutual co-operation until the next time of meeting the following year.

### 'Raison d'être' of the Pilgrimage

Pious and humble, but strong, they assemble; stripped of greed, but active; weak before God, but mighty against their problems and their enemies; solicitous of the rights of others, but sure of their own appointed place in the sun.

I remember that I mentioned some of these thoughts to H.M. King Sa'ud, and he replied to me: "It is indeed the real *raison d'être* of the Pilgrimage." To tell the truth, I myself am unable to imagine any other *raison d'être*.

When I consider the 80 million Muslims in Indonesia, and the 50 million in China, and the millions in Malaya, Siam, and Burma, and the close-to-100 million in the Middle East, and the 40 million inside the Soviet Union, and the other millions in far-flung parts of the world—when I consider these hundreds of millions united by a single creed, I emerge with a sense of tremendous possibilities which we may realise through the co-operation of all these Muslims, a co-operation not going beyond the bounds of their natural loyalty to their own countries, but which will enable them and their brothers in faith to wield a power without limit.

And now I go back to the wandering role looking for a hero to play it. The role is there. Its characteristics have been described. This is the stage. By the laws of geographical circumstance, we alone are able to play it.